It would seem that Japan is emerging as Beijing's targeted bad boy. Internet users are posting angry messages on Web sites designed to let out their hatred against Japan -- some are even predicting war in the not too distant future. The Chinese authorities are quick to shut down sites advocating democracy and other activities frowned on by them. But they look the other way where Japan-bashing is concerned.
Why is Beijing allowing it? One explanation could be that it is a safety valve to channel popular disaffection into an over-arching national cause with the broadest popular appeal. Japan fits the bill. It hasn't apologized adequately for its wartime atrocities and it has sought to whitewash its history books by tinkering with wartime facts to paint Japan in a favorable light.
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has angered China by his annual visits to the Yasukini shrine, which houses its war dead, including World War II war criminals. Its recent defense policy white paper has infuriated Beijing by labeling China (and North Korea) as security threats. According to press reports, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Koizumi -- are barely on speaking terms.
And Japan is proving difficult to manage in terms of China's regional and global leadership ambitions.
China is working to become a superpower. The timing is right because the US is stuck with Iraq and global terrorism. In other words, the US is over-extending itself. According to Qian Qichen (錢其琛), China's former foreign minister and an influential policy formulator, the US' doctrine of pre-emption and overdependence on military force will lead to "absolute insecurity of the American Empire and its demise because of expansion it cannot cope with."
Therefore, China sees excellent opportunities in America's predicament. It has already made quite an impact in Southeast Asia through a series of diplomatic and trade initiatives -- ?the most important being a free-trade agreement with ASEAN.
Additionally, South Korea has virtually detached itself from its alliance with the US. According to academics James Auer and Robyn Lim "? South Korea has become a de facto ally of China. Thus its value to the US as an ally has been undermined, and the congruence of strategic interest that underpinned this alliance during the Cold War is rapidly eroding."
Seoul is not comfortable with Washington's hard line on North Korea. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has been urging the US to be more tolerant of North Korea, even calling its nuclear ambitions an "understandable" attempt at defense. Both North and South Korea are now part of China's regional political and security zone.
Looking north, Beijing has cleared the decks to further develop relations with Russia with the signing of a border agreement between the two countries. And it is seeking to improve relations with India.
In other words, China's political and security environment is quite benign. Even the US seems keen to keep China on its side, aware of its own difficult situation. That would explain why Washington is keen to "rein in" Taipei, lest it provokes China and creates more difficulties for the US.
The trick for Beijing, though, is to manage its relationship with the US without seemingly challenging its global supremacy. This might make the US less concerned about China's regional and global ambitions. And it could even create a political partnership of sorts between the two countries.
It is worth noting that, for some time now, Beijing has generally avoided branding the US a "hegemonic" power. It used to be the hallmark of its frequent pronouncements on US foreign policy. Even the most recent criticism of the US' global over-reach by Qian, has been played down, amid claims that he wasn't really its author.
In other words Beijing has opted for cooperation rather than confrontation with the US, regarding it as a strategic necessity. It hopes that it will bear political dividends on Taiwan by diluting the US' commitment to defend the island.
Beijing doesn't want the world to think that China is an expansionist power in the old colonial tradition. It is, therefore, keen to send a benign message. According to a senior Chinese diplomat, "There is a fear about the future orientation of Chinese foreign policy. It is not surprising because in world history many big powers rose and caused earthquakes. But ... China is going to be different because the world has changed. It's not like in the past when powers had to expand territorially in order to get markets."
This is no longer necessary in a globalized world, she said. In any case, "China is going to primarily engage with its own [internal] problems for a long time to come."
In other words it doesn't have a "hegemonic" agenda, and is not competing with the US for global supremacy.
This broad message, repeated in bilateral and multilateral contacts, has acquired a certain resonance of its own in many Asian countries. A notable exception is Japan, which regards China as a threat. Japan is not buying China's message of "peaceful rise."
According to Robert Sutter at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, "Chinese officials and specialists ? admit that Japan poses a special problem for China's peaceful and moderate approach to Asia, and that US support for Japan feeds into this problem."
Indeed, Tokyo is no longer a passive element in the US-Japan security alliance. It is participating in the development of the US missile defense system, has committed (non-combatant) troops in Iraq and is generally going in the direction of re-interpreting or modifying its pacifist Constitution.
China, therefore, has a problem in Asia with Japan. The mistake, though, is to treat Japan as an American appendage. Beijing hopes to deal with Tokyo as part of its strategic equation with the US. But Japan will be a difficult customer, with or without its US alliance.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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