In the past, the outcomes of the legislative elections in Taiwan have hardly been a decisive factor in US-Taiwan relations. Although the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) jointly won a majority in the legislative election in 2001 following the transition of power in 2000, society remained fractured and its political institutions in disarray due to the deep divide between the pan-blue and pan-green camps.
Now that pan-blue camp has retained the legislative majority in Saturday's election, the highly politicized situation looks likely to continue, and political struggles are likely to persist over issues such as the government's budget, nomination of Control Yuan members, a Cabinet reshuffle, constitutional reform and rectification of the country's name.
If the pan-green camp had won a majority, the government would have encountered less opposition from the legislature and there would have been a more consistent approach. It would have allowed the DPP for the first time to be in control of the legislature as well as the executive, and enjoy the advantages the KMT had held over a long period of time.
The failure of the pan-green camp and the victory of the pan-blue in this legislative election, however, will put greater pressure on President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) administration in its attempt to construct a Taiwan identity.
Beijing is certainly pleased to see an outcome like this. The US government has mixed feelings toward both the pan-green and pan-blue camps, one the one hand worrying that the pan-greens might push the sovereignty issue too hard, but disliking the blue camp's obstruction of the US arms-purchase budget.
Less than 100 days into his first term, US President George W. Bush showed his goodwill toward Taiwan by approving the sale of advanced weapons and other measures to help Taiwan defend itself. US-Taiwan relations reached their highest point at this time. In the last year, however, the relationship has been strained. This is the result of a lack of a direct communication channel between the leaders of the two countries. In addition, Taiwan's political agenda has progressed so rapidly that the bureaucracy has been unable to keep pace with decision-makers, and policies have lagged behind the rapidly changing political situation.
Mutual trust between Taiwan and the US has been undermined, and both sides must bear some responsibility for this. In the past, the US supported the democratization of Taiwan, yet it is now worried about the unrestrained development of that democracy. Rather than just observing Taiwan's development, it is now inclined to interfere. On Taiwan's side, there is the postponement of the US arms procurement deal, as well as government inefficiency and the priority of political considerations by the pan-green and pan-blue camps, which has meant that public policy issues that should be at the top of the political agenda have been stalled.
The purchase of submarines, long-range anti-submarine aircraft and Patriot missiles have long been called for by Taiwan's leaders, the Ministry of National Defense and defense analysts in Taiwan. Of course, the pan-blue camp has different considerations and retired generals are entitled to change their minds, but the result is that Taiwan's national defense needs and even the need to maintain a level of mutual trust with the US has been ignored.
Pentagon officials and members of various US think tanks have pointed out that Taiwan's arms procurement deal with the US will play an important role in US-Taiwan relations, and have warned that if Taiwan does not manage the issue of purchasing these long-sought weapons with the utmost caution, this would have a serious impact on US-Taiwan relations during Bush's second term in office.
If the US comes to the conclusion that Taiwan's people and political parties are not serious or determined enough about self-defense to ensure a level of preparedness acceptable to the US, this will have a negative impact on US-Taiwan security cooperation in future.
Bush may believe that with a pan-blue majority in the legislature, constitutional reform and the campaign to change Taiwan's name will meet with greater obstacles, and this will reduce the opportunities for the Chen government to rile China. But the fact that the US government has also been inconsistent in its support of Taiwan's democracy is also worth
considering.
In the past, the US used the lure of arms sales to pressure the KMT government into lifting martial law, and now it is using the question of regional security to pressure the Chen administration to moderate its reforms. Its attitude toward Taiwan's
referendum was one of disapproval, but it did not move to interfere.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell recently said the US supported "peaceful reunification," but two days later he was forced to clarify his comments, for admonishing Chen in such strong terms was not to the US's advantage. In his second term, Bush has been more outspoken -- and has responded more quickly -- when dealing with actions by Taipei of which he disapproves.
In doing this, he deprives Taipei of any room to make its own interpretations. Now that the pan-blue camp has consolidated its legislative majority, the US may not feel the need to use such harsh measures to keep Taiwan in line.
Lin Cheng-yi is director of the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Daniel Cheng and Ian Bartholomew
There is much evidence that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is sending soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and is learning lessons for a future war against Taiwan. Until now, the CCP has claimed that they have not sent PLA personnel to support Russian aggression. On 18 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelinskiy announced that the CCP is supplying war supplies such as gunpowder, artillery, and weapons subcomponents to Russia. When Zelinskiy announced on 9 April that the Ukrainian Army had captured two Chinese nationals fighting with Russians on the front line with details
On a quiet lane in Taipei’s central Daan District (大安), an otherwise unremarkable high-rise is marked by a police guard and a tawdry A4 printout from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicating an “embassy area.” Keen observers would see the emblem of the Holy See, one of Taiwan’s 12 so-called “diplomatic allies.” Unlike Taipei’s other embassies and quasi-consulates, no national flag flies there, nor is there a plaque indicating what country’s embassy this is. Visitors hoping to sign a condolence book for the late Pope Francis would instead have to visit the Italian Trade Office, adjacent to Taipei 101. The death of
By now, most of Taiwan has heard Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an’s (蔣萬安) threats to initiate a vote of no confidence against the Cabinet. His rationale is that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led government’s investigation into alleged signature forgery in the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) recall campaign constitutes “political persecution.” I sincerely hope he goes through with it. The opposition currently holds a majority in the Legislative Yuan, so the initiation of a no-confidence motion and its passage should be entirely within reach. If Chiang truly believes that the government is overreaching, abusing its power and targeting political opponents — then
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), joined by the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), held a protest on Saturday on Ketagalan Boulevard in Taipei. They were essentially standing for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is anxious about the mass recall campaign against KMT legislators. President William Lai (賴清德) said that if the opposition parties truly wanted to fight dictatorship, they should do so in Tiananmen Square — and at the very least, refrain from groveling to Chinese officials during their visits to China, alluding to meetings between KMT members and Chinese authorities. Now that China has been defined as a foreign hostile force,
RSS