Despite high praise for President Chen Shui-bian's (
Intentionally overlooking Chen's suggestion to initiate confidence building measures to minimize cross-strait tensions -- including establishing an arms control mechanism and a "code of conduct across the Taiwan Strait" to reduce miscalculations -- China distracted public attention away from such pragmatic and strategic thinking about the sovereignty issue as a way to invalidate Chen's proposals.
Instead, the spokesman of China's Taiwan Affairs Office Zhang Mingqing (
Regretfully, this is not the first time that Beijing has sabotaged Chen's conciliatory gestures. Starting with his first inaugural address in 2000, Chen has consistently offered olive branches to his counterparts across the Strait. Not only has Chen agreed to discuss the question of a "future China" with Beijing, he has also proposed a model for "political integration" with China. On several occasions, he invited Chinese leaders to sit down -- in any place and at any time -- to straighten out mutual disputes.
China's downplaying of Chen's moderate gesture entails both domestic and external concerns. After successfully transferring power from the old generation to the so-called "fourth generation" of leaders, it is imperative for Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) to consolidate his power base by appealing to nationalism. By characterizing Chen and his government as hardcore separatists and independence advocates, Hu can strengthen his leadership and quiet Taiwan's unilateral pursuit of independent sovereignty.
Externally, Beijing has never given up its strategy of trying to take advantage of Taiwan's post-election political "turmoil" as a grounds for Beijing to "step in" and interfere with Taiwan's domestic affairs. Unless the pan-green camp can secure a majority after the December legislative elections, the chances for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to re-engage in mutual dialogue remain slim.
The question is, can Beijing maintain its policy of no contact with the Chen administration for the next four years? More importantly, can China put all its money on a resurgence of the pan-blues, without recognizing the "Taiwan consciousness?" Is time really on China's side?
The best scenario for restarting cross-strait contacts, under the current circumstances, is for the pan-green camp to win over half the seats in the legislature. With renewed public endorsement, the Chen administration will have more leeway to initiate cross-strait normalization. However, it takes two to tango. Were the pan-greens to succeed during the upcoming legislative elections, Beijing should relinquish its outdated strategy of trying to separate the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government from the Taiwanese public.
Moreover, international forces, led by the US, should accelerate their role in facilitating cross-strait talks. More should be done to educate the Chinese leadership to respect the decisions made by the Taiwanese people through democratic mechanisms and accept the offer that was presented by the DPP government to establish a peaceful and stable cross-strait relationship.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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