Taiwan and China did not reach a consensus during their 1992 meeting in Hong Kong. Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) confirmed that there was no consensus at all. Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) also said, "If we must say there was a consensus after the 1992 meeting, then the most realistic consensus was `there was no consensus.'" Wasn't Lee's statement clear enough? Who can be more authoritative than Lee on the matter?
In his Double Ten National Day speech, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) suggested that the two sides "use the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong" for future negotiations. The "1992 meeting" is a correct term, compared with the so-called "1992 consensus." However, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) has distorted Chen's words, arguing there was a consensus reached. As Lien said, the spirit of the 1992 meeting lay in the consensus of "one China," with each side making its own interpretation. He therefore questioned whether Chen -- who refused to acknowledge the "1992 consensus" in the past -- has decided to accept Beijing's policy of "one country, two systems" by mentioning the 1992 meeting again. Chen's mention of the 1992 meeting was just a statement of fact.
The consensus of "one China, with each side making its own interpretation" will certainly lead to "one country, two systems." On the contrary, the 1992 meeting was simply a meeting without any conclusion. Naturally, a consensus does not exist.
The point is, why does Lien have to define the 1992 meeting as a consensus? Obviously, his purpose is to promote the idea of a consensus. This is tantamount to accepting Beijing's "one China" principle. In light of the remarks made by China's Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Zhang Mingqing (張銘清), we can understand why Lien and the blue camp are holding up the idea of a "1992 consensus" -- the KMT and Bei-jing are becoming friends in light of their pro-unification stance.
Zhang's words were very clear: "In 1992, China's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait [ARATS] and the SEF reached the consensus verbally that the two sides adhere to the `one China' principle. This fact cannot be denied."
"If Taiwan's leaders ac-knowledge the `1992 consensus,' then cross-strait dialogue and talks could be resumed immediately. This stand has never changed," Zhang said.
His words are exactly the same as those of Lien. The only difference is that Beijing is ser-ious about its "one China" (meaning the People's Republic of China, PRC) principle, while Lien and the blue camp are perhaps not so serious about their "one China" (meaning the Republic of China, ROC) principle.
Specifically, Lien is using the ROC -- which has ceased to exist -- to smuggle the PRC into Taiwan. Otherwise, why would Beijing possibly agree with the idea of "one China, with each side making its own interpretation?"
According to China's latest white paper entitled, The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, published in 2000, "In 1949, the PRC's government was proclaimed, replacing the ROC's government to become the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena, thereby bringing the historical status of the ROC to an end." As a result, acknowledging "one China" is acknowledging Beijing's policy of "one country, two systems." How can there be any variation in this interpretation?
Thus, there was no consensus reached during the 1992 meeting, nor was there a consensus on "one China, with each side making its own interpretation."
Chin Heng-wei is editor-in-chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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