On Monday, the EU rejected France's demand that the group's 15-year arms embargo on China be lifted, and once again criticized Beijing's human rights record. For the sake of international security, and the protection of human rights, the EU made the right decision.
The EU's arms ban on China was imposed in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. The EU policy was aimed at preventing the Chinese government from using its weapons again in a crackdown on its unarmed citizens and to prevent the union becoming an accomplice in Beijing's abuse of human rights.
Given this background, if one wanted to lift the ban, the very first question that should be asked is: Has China's rights record been improved? The answer is "No." In fact, an EU statement on Monday noted a "positive trend" in some areas, but also warned of continuing worries in regards to freedom of expression, religion, assembly and association.
As the statement note, "There has been no progress in the respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities in particular as regards religious freedoms ... in particular in Tibet and Xinjiang."
The second question that should be asked is whether China lacks arms. China is a major power in the Asia-Pacific, and its defense budget reached US$50 billion this year. With more than 100 strategic missiles, more than 600 long-range ballistic missiles, a navy of more than 2,000 vessels and an airforce with more than 3,000 fighter jets, China's military might shames that of its neighbors. It is more than able to defend itself. Even Japan now treats China as a future military threat. An EU decision to lift its embargo would clearly have a negative effect on security in the Asia-Pacific region, since Beijing would be able to obtain advanced European arms systems.
The third question is, why does China need arms? Contrary to French and German concerns, a clash in the Taiwan Strait will not begin with a Taiwanese attack, but rather it will begin with China, which has over 600 missiles aimed at Taiwan. EU sales of radar, communications and other high-tech equipment to China could cause Beijing to intensify its threat to Taiwan, exacerbating the cross-strait arms race, and threatening security in the Asia-Pacific region.
The fourth question is, what would be the purpose of EU arms sales to China? The weapons trade is a highly profitable one, but unless these weapons are used for self-defense, it is an immoral trade that is paid for in blood. Civilized countries do not seek to earn money that is stained with the blood of millions. The EU's "code of conduct" on arms sales forbids the sale of arms to nations with poor rights records and countries which might use the weapons to oppress their own people. This code of conduct should be made more stringent -- and legally enforceable.
Taiwan is a country that loves peace, and if it were not for the threat posed by China, Taiwan would not be spending lots of money on weaponry. The controversial arms procurement budget now before the legislature is for weapons being purchased as a
response to China's threat.
Taiwan has made numerous gestures to indicate its desire to reduce cross-strait tensions. This year, the government cancelled the live-fire portion of the Hankuang military exercises and next year it will begin withdrawing troops from outlaying islands.
It has also expressed its willingness to use the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong to seek possible formats for future talks to establish a cross-strait structure for peace and security and establish a committee for cross-strait peace and development.
China should not ignore these gestures. The international community should support the two sides of the Strait in engaging in peaceful negotiations rather than facilitating an arms race by providing arms to Beijing.
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