China has recently urged the EU to lift the arms-sale embargo against it. We need to pay attention to this development as it is relevant to the EU's cross-strait policies and may endanger the military balance between Taiwan and China. It has even become the critical wrestling arena for Beijing and Taipei in their diplomatic maneuvers in Europe.
For a long time, cross-strait issues have not been an EU focus. Despite its official observation of the "one China" policy, the EU has always insisted that maintaining a peaceful cross-strait situation and military balance is the bottom line. This policy, however, went through a major change in the mid-1990s. At that time, the EU began to view China as a strategic partner, with whom the EU countries wanted to cement a comprehensive relationship. This change in policy was mainly decided by such core members as France, Germany and Italy.
The EU established the arms embargo against China after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Over the past two years, Beijing has taken frequent action to urge the organization to remove the ban. Among EU members, France has taken a pioneering and leading position on the issue.
China's maneuvers in Europe have significant political and military implications.
Politically, Beijing hopes to use this issue to do away with the historical burden of the Tiananmen Square incident and normalize the Europe-China relationship. Militarily, Beijing intends to have more than one country from which to source weapons.
China has long purchased arms mainly from Russia. Not happy with Russia's technology transfer, after-sales service and equipment management, Beijing realizes that a long-term dependency on Russia will only slow the modernization of its military.
The EU's removal of the arms-sale ban, on the other hand, provides an opportunity for China's military modernization and expands its leverage in terms of negotiation, further opening up the possibility of future larger-scale military cooperation between China and Europe.
As far as the military balance across the Strait is concerned, once the embargo is lifted, not only is the EU's bottom line of maintaining cross-strait peace and military balance broken, but China may also exploit the process of cementing a closer political relationship with the EU to shatter its isolation in military technology -- which the US had built up around the country -- and further block Taiwan's sourcing channels in Europe.
In addition, the removal of the arms-sale embargo implies that Beijing may be able to access key arms and equipment that Taiwan has purchased from the EU, such as its Mirage 2000 and Lafayette frigates. This will severely endanger the delicate military balance across the Strait.
For now, however, the move to lift the ban is facing resistance in the EU's internal decision-making body. During last December's EU summit in Italy, 14 out of 15 members opposed France's proposal to remove the 15-year arms embargo against China. The European Parliament voted down the motion by 373 votes against 32 votes, and stressed that China has to prove better protection of human rights before the parliament will consider the ban's removal.
Despite this, under the proactive leadership of France, the proposal to remove the ban received support from the UK, Germany and Italy early this year. Countries that used to insist on human rights issues, such as Sweden and Netherlands, also showed their understanding and responded in a positive manner.
Therefore, in the face of the possible lifting of the arms embargo, Taiwan has to develop a response strategy.
First, we need to strengthen the forces within the EU that are against the removal of the arms-sale ban.
The EU bases its decision to restrict arms sales on an internal criteria. It enacted two codes of practice in 1998 regarding weapons sales: EU-made arms cannot be used to sabotage regional stability and balance, and EU-made weapons cannot be used to oppress dissidents within a country.
Germany, in principle, will not export arms to areas where there are wars or military tensions. Taiwan therefore should use these codes and principles to lobby the EU against selling to China crucial weapons that may influence regional stability and balance.
Second, we need to enhance influence over the European Parliament's policies and facilitate the drafting of a Taiwan Relations Act. The parliament now plays a balancing role in the EU's cross-strait policies, taking a stricter attitude toward China's human rights issues. It also passed several resolutions that are quite friendly to Taiwan.
Therefore, Taiwan should actively lobby Taiwan-friendly forces in the parliament. If a Taiwan Relations Act can be passed by the European Parliament before the total removal of the arms-sale embargo, a clearer policy can be ensured to safeguard the bottom line of peaceful cross-strait development and military balance.
Finally, we should introduce the counteracting force of the US and Japan. In fact, these two countries are highly concerned about the issue and have attempted to get involved in the internal decision making of the EU. The US even said that it would boycott such a resolution by the EU by way of sanctions.
Additionally, there are many new EU members from eastern Europe that maintain close economic and political relations with the US. Though their influence remains quite limited within the EU, Taiwan can still lobby these countries so they can have a key influence.
Hao Pei-chih is an assistant professor of public administration and policy at National Taipei University.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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