There was something bitterly apt about the sight of New Party thugs beating up Taiwan Solidarity Union supporters who had the "temerity" to raise their own Taiwan flag on yesterday's "national day." Taiwanese who wanted to be left alone being beaten up and having their event hijacked by the thuggish agents of a foreign power: it seemed to encapsulate Taiwan's entire historical experience.
But the real business of the day was in Chen Shui-bian's
The idea here dates back to talks held in Hong Kong in 1992 to prepare the way for discussions between representatives of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Had each side insisted on its own definition of the status of Taiwan, these talks would never have gotten off the ground. So eventually there was an agreement to disagree, usually referred to as the "1992 consensus," where both sides agreed on as much as they could and resolved not to challenge the other side's position where that differed from their own. They agreed that there was "one China" and they also agreed that they would not challenge each other's interpretation of what that "one China" was.
Since he came to power in 2000 Chen has been extremely reluctant to embrace the "1992 consensus," for which he has been criticized both by Beijing and by the pan-blues. Chen's reluctance stems from the lack of democratic process involved in the original "consensus." The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government at the time had not been elected by the people of Taiwan and had no mandate. Any agreement it reached with China about anything was therefore only driven by party ideology; it in no way reflected the wishes of the people of Taiwan, whom had never been consulted.
Chen was quite right to refuse to adhere to a position which had no democratic legitimacy, and many of those who criticized him for being recalcitrant, especially in Washington, should have known better. But what are we to make of Chen's latest statement? Frankly, without more flesh on the bones it is hard to tell what sort of beast this is. Chen's intention appears to be that Taiwan and China can use the "each side having its own interpretation" formula to ease tensions and find some kind of common ground. The real problem is that using only half of the formula doesn't make sense. The entire formula was a way of finding the minimum that was acceptable to each side -- Beijing would never tolerate any suggestion of Taiwan's independence while Taiwan would simply never agree that China -- which included Taiwan -- was coextensive in meaning with the PRC. Each half of the formula addressed a basic concern of one of the two sides, which is why the formula worked. It balanced one set of concerns with another.
What Chen appears to be suggesting does not do this. Given the lack of detail in Chen's speech, it is hard to comment further. What we need to know is: Is Chen really trying to use only the second half of the 1992 equation? If so, expect a chilly reception from China.
Or does Chen now implicitly accept the whole formula, which will come as a profound shock to many members of his own party? We need to know.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS