Is Academia Sinica membership a high-ranking position? This is an interesting question -- it's like asking if a general is a high-ranking member of the military. Like oranges and apples, we should not really compare generals and academics, but the paradox is that these two groups of people have started working together.
Yet it does not seem as paradoxical when we consider their collaboration in the context of the nation's process of democratization.
Led by Lao Sze-kwang (勞思光), 11 pan-blue Academia Sinica members last week signed a petition against the budget to purchase US arms. They are in effect opposing local authority and Taiwan's independence. They have each devoted their life to fighting Chinese communism, and suddenly they start to worship the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) -- a party that puts no value on democracy or human rights -- and the Beijing leadership from Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) onward.
Lao, on the other hand, describes the democratic nation of Taiwan as an authoritarian regime. The arms procurement project, which is aimed at defending Taiwan and countering the threat of war, is being painted as an action that would help Beijing to win without starting a war.
If so, then why is China doing its best to intimidate or coax the US to not sell weapons to Taiwan? Beijing argues that arms deals will encourage Taiwan to claim independence.
By protesting the arms purchase, the 11 petitioners are singing the same tune as Beijing. Although Beijing and the academics have different motivations and agendas, their appeals are basically the same. The pan-blue petitioners obviously side with China on this issue.
What on earth has happened to these academics, after having dedicated most of their lives to advocating democracy and opposing communism?
The good news is that there are only 11 of them siding with Beijing, which represents only a small portion of the humanities institutes at Academia Sinica. Apparently, the pan-blue camp's best efforts have only succeeded in mobilizing this tiny minority.
However, those who side with the pan-blue camp are not limited to academic circles. More than 100 retired generals joined the academics in a protest against the arms purchase on Sept. 25. They represent the same pan-blue ideology.
It is worth noting that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party attempted a "coup" in the seven days following the presidential election. They tried to gain support from the military, but neither serving nor retired military personnel responded.
The problem is: are soldiers entitled to oppose arms procurements? If they are, what do we need the armed forces for? When generals take to the streets to oppose the arms deal, it is tantamount to dismembering the armed forces. How can they face their colleagues?
The US Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John Kerry, experienced a decline in his popularity simply because he, as a decorated military hero, took an anti-war approach after retiring from the army. He was not only cast aside by his former colleagues, but also disdained by voters.
The pan-blue camp is in fact resorting to its last viable resource when mobilizing these academics and generals.
By doing this, the academics simply tarnish their own reputation, but the generals are taking themselves down a path toward self-destruction.
Chin Heng-wei is editor-in-chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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