The recent discussions on military procurement by many experts and scholars have mainly considered the issue from a domestic perspective. This article does not aim to reject the points already made, but aims instead to consider the procurement issue from a realist perspective of international politics. The point I would like to make is that the nation's military procurement (and more broadly, the cross-strait issue), is actually part of a geostrategic tussle among major powers in East Asia.
To be sure, Taiwan's unilateral refusal to procure weapons won't solve the cross-strait problem. But the result of a massive purchase of arms will only lock the country further into a conflict between major powers in the region.
It is generally known that the nation's arms procurement is mainly a response to China's buildup of missiles targeting Taiwan, and its upgrading of military capability. By gaining a military advantage over Taiwan during the next few years, China hopes to achieve the political goal of solving the "Taiwan problem." In fact, China believes that the real cause of this problem is US support for Taiwan, so both politically and militarily, China regards the US as its foremost antagonist.
There are those in the US and Japan who believe that if China sought to solve the Taiwan problem through military means, it would in fact be challenging the US-dominated order in East Asia. In terms of geostrategy, China would have broken through the so-called "First Island Chain," and be in an advantageous position to launch a comprehensive naval strategy challenging the dominance of the US-Japan alliance in East Asia.
Looked at this way, the cross-strait problem is simply one piece of a larger regional power struggle. The reason for this is that the balance of power between the major players has begun to shift, and the Taiwan issue serves as a prelude to this larger phenomenon.
Second, the economic development of China's coastal provinces makes it one of the world's largest importers of crude oil. Imported crude oil supplies 30 percent of its demand, and five-sixths of this must pass through the Strait of Malacca and east Asian waterways to reach China. Strategically, China's command of this supply route is extremely fragile.
To overcome this problem, China must achieve a degree of strategic superiority in the western Pacific. This is of considerable importance to China's long-term strategy. Looked at in these geopolitical terms, Taiwan assumes an even greater importance to China, as its ability to break through the First Island Chain would be a decisive factor in ensuring China's strategic advantage.
For this reason, a Taiwan supported by the US and Japan is a major headache for China. So for China, the problem posed by Taiwan is not simply a "cross-strait" issue, but one of long-term geostrategic interests.
For this reason, even if Taiwan rejected the purchase of arms from the US, this would not necessarily help move toward a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue.
To summarize, the logic of political realism means that even if the cross-strait issue were solved, there would be no guarantee of a peaceful order within East Asia. But if there is a conflict between major powers within the region, countries on both sides of the Strait will necessarily become involved.
Moreover, if the cross-strait issue erupts into conflict, this will be a signal for conflict among other powers in East Asia. If we are to avoid such a conflict, we must find a way to maintain cross-strait peace. Whether it is possible to do so depends on whether major powers within East Asia are willing or able to find a balance between their interests.
The dilemma of military procurement that Taiwan faces originated in the contest between China and the US in East Asia. To settle the cross-strait issue, we must build a structure that balances the interests of China and the US in the region. The cross-strait issue would be incorporated in such a structure. Otherwise Taiwan's interests will be exploited by these two major powers.
Simply accepting China's "one China" principle is to ignore the anxiety that China's rise is now causing the US and other nations. It would also cause a breach in the First Island Chain and facilitate a rapid development of China's expansionist maritime strategy. Consequently, it will cause a further imbalance of power in East Asia, and possibly accelerate the advent of a conflict among big powers in the region.
But if Taiwan were to push for independence hastily and thus disregard China's core national interest, it could also immediately trigger conflicts among the big powers in East Asia. As Taiwan would be at the center of such a conflict, its people, territory and society would be devastated.
It is also likely that Taiwan's interests might be betrayed in the course of negotiations between big powers during the settlement of such a conflict. That could mean that not only would Taiwan gain nothing -- it could even stand to lose from such a conflict. On top of that, the critical point in all these scenarios is that Taiwan, which is not a major power, will certainly not be in a position to direct events.
The idea of a "balance of power" was originally proposed by Hans Morgenthau, a proponent of political realism as a mechanism for maintaining peace in the context of the international political structure. Political realism in East Asia can and should also use the goal of peace as a directing principle. Although it is a pawn in the battle between conflicting major powers, Taiwan can also be a source of peace for them.
We must recognize the structural origins of this conflict and then boldly take the initiative to promote a peace proposal that not only meets Taiwan's own interests, but also the regional interests of peace and stability. Without such a proposal, real peace across the Taiwan Strait will elude us.
If the proposal can satisfy some interests of the US, China and Japan and create a balance between them, it could serve as a powerful guide to action and discourse in the region. In so doing, Taiwan might be able to detach the cross-strait issue from the larger power struggle in the region. In the context of balancing the regional power structure, wishful thinking about unification or independence is meaningless -- and may even undermine regional peace.
Hsu Szu-chien is an assistant research fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica.
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