Not only did Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) not accept their defeat in this year's presidential election, but they also deliberately sought to whip up their disgruntled supporters' emotions to create a riot. Their behavior not only damaged the country, it also hurt the two men's public approval ratings, which plunged more than 20 percent. In short, their antics nearly destroyed their political careers.
Why wasn't Lien capable of admitting defeat? We perhaps could have predicted that beha-vior from his "pure Chinese" stance -- emphasized during his visit to the US -- which makes him believe in a culture with zero tolerance for defeat.
The barbarity of the Chinese soccer fans at the end of the recent 2004 Asian Cup final in Beijing displays a similar belief. After China lost to Japan, Chinese soccer fans burned Japanese flags, besieged the Japanese team buses, and shouted for the extermination of all Japanese devils.
In both sports competitions and democratic elections, there are three fundamental principles: to abide by the rules of the game, compete peacefully and accept defeat gracefully. Both the behavior of Lien and Soong and the riot of Chinese soccer fans in Beijing were the result of ignoring these foundations of civilized sport and society. Whenever they encounter an unfavorable situation, such people invariably throw a tantrum. For them, whether it's in sports or elections, it's not a competition of skills or popularity, but a chance to see who has the best dirty tricks.
We have witnessed the inability of Chinese soccer fans to accept defeat before. In the summer of 1985 in Beijing, after the Chinese soccer team lost to Hong Kong in the World Cup qualifier, Beijing's soccer fans became violent -- looting shops, damaging cars and injuring foreigners.
This inability to tolerate defeat originates chiefly from feelings of inferiority and arrogance. The arrogance comes from China's long history, its rich territory and its soaring economic development in recent years. There is a self-inflated mindset which cherishes the illusion that the 21st century is a century for Chinese people. But at the same time, many Chinese people think their country isn't superior enough to be truly respected by international society -- and therein lies their inferiority complex.
Not being able to accept losing means having no confidence in winning again. Only by resorting to emotional behavior can these sore losers soothe the feelings of inferiority brought by defeat.
Permitting such irrational display of feelings in an individual can lead to tragedy. In a nation it can bring calamity. If the Chinese government continues to support and incite the fanatic sentiment of nationalism, it will one day bring catastrophe on itself.
Cao Chang-ching is a writer based in the US.
TRANSLATED BY LIN YA-TI
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