The emergence of a national identity has led Taiwan to redefine its US policy. This could hurt US relations if domestic considerations prevail over strategic interests. President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in his inauguration address on May 20, however, seemed to placate US concerns.
He promised that the revision of the Constitution would not touch on the issues of statehood and sovereignty. He also tacitly reiterated the "five noes" pledge he made four years ago.
Beneath that moderation, however, Taiwan has quietly moved toward a more aggressive foreign policy. Presidential advisor Koo Kuan-min (辜寬敏) has called on the US to revise its "one China" policy. And Minister of Foreign Affairs Mark Chen (陳唐山) has said that the international community should respect Taiwan as a sovereign and independent nation.
The policy shift led to diplomatic tensions with the US in April. Mark Chen stressed that independence and sovereignty were Taiwan's status quo. But Washington rebuked that stance. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly said that Washington would only agree to the status quo as the US defined it.
The US definition of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is quite simple, even though the US policy may seem contradictory. In theory, Washington acknowledges the three communiques it signed with Beijing that say Taiwan is part of China. In practice, however, it considers Taiwan's status to be unresolved and is committed to help the nation defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act.
The cross-strait status quo, according to Washington, means that China must refrain from using or threatening to use force against Taiwan, while Taiwan must avoid provoking Beijing with unilateral moves toward de facto independence.
The diplomatic status quo is reinforced by the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. China's weight in the status quo at first derived from the support of the majority of countries that echo the "one China" principle. But the rise of a Taiwanese identity has weakened the status quo by diminishing Beijing's bargaining power.
To regain leverage, China is trying to tip the military balance in its favor by upping the ante in the cross-strait arms race. But "balance of power" tends to be a tricky concept. If China's goal is to invade Taiwan, the balance of power is, for now, in Taipei's favor because Beijing does not have the amphibious capacity nor the adequate air cover it requires to carry out an invasion, according to a recent Pentagon report.
But if China's objective is to threaten Taiwan's integrity with its 500 missiles, then Beijing already has an edge, since Taipei hasn't acquired the Patriot anti-missile batteries offered by the Bush administration, and is still negotiating to obtain the AEGIS defense system.
The Chen administration should ask Washington to include Taiwan with Japan and South Korea in its proposed missile defense shield, because it looks unlikely that Taiwan can sustain an arms race with China in the long term.
The "one China" policy is a by-product of the Cold War. Its aim was to woo China and confront the Soviet Union with the possibility of a two-front war. But it still serves US interests. The challenge of terrorism has now replaced the Soviet threat and Washington needs China's cooperation over North Korea and the Middle East.
Were Taiwan to see cross-strait relations as a zero-sum game, it could risk the US returning to the "three noes" policy implemented by the Clinton administration. But the widening gap between US and Taiwanese interests comes from Taiwan's failure to understand the meaning of what an alliance is. The Taiwan Relations Act is a US law, not an alliance treaty, but its content turns US-Taiwan relations into a quasi alliance.
Certain statements by Taiwanese officials and the controversy over the possible dispatch of Taiwanese marines to Iraq reflected Taiwan's mismanagement of US ties. When Washington expressed its concern over constitutional reforms, some officials reacted violently by saying that the US was interfering with the nation's internal affairs.
Koo has said that Taiwan is not a colonial state of the US. True, Taiwan does not need to halt its plan to create a new Constitution simply because the US opposes it.
But an alliance, by definition, implies coordinated policies and actions. An alliance offers rights and advantages, but it also sets duties and constraints.
It also serves mutual interests. Taiwan can rely on US military aid to counter China's military threat. And Washington can check China's expansion in the South China Sea through its cooperation with Taiwan.
Chen and public opinion made it clear that Taiwan would not shed blood in the Middle East after two US congressmen introduced a resolution in May calling for the deployment of Taiwanese troops in Iraq. Yet it would be foolish to think that the US would sacrifice its grand strategy in Asia in the name of Taiwanese independence. Kelly bluntly said in April that the US wouldn't defend Taiwan under all circumstances.
No president could sell a war to the US public for the sake of Taiwanese independence. There would be a disjuncture between the perils and the benefits of such a war. US public opinion may accept a war against Chinese militarism, but that would imply a Chinese attack without Taiwanese provocation.
Taiwan must avoid an aggressive cross-strait policy if it does not want to jeopardize its relations with Washington. As such, it should focus on underground diplomacy. That would be more efficient than loud policy pronouncements.
Taiwan should increase efforts on the diplomatic front to prevent the EU from lifting its embargo on arms sales to China. Yet it should also continue to offer olive branches to China. That would help convince the US government that the Chen administration is sincere in dealing with China.
Were Beijing to reject Taipei's offers for talks over the next four years, Washington would draw its own conclusions about China's real motives and eventually upgrade the Taiwan Relations Act.
Trung Latieule is a journalist based in Paris.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
RSS