Recent discussion from within the pan-blue camp on whether Ma Ying-jeou's (
Nevertheless, there are at least four hurdles that Ma and Wang will have to jump before publicly unveiling their intention to run in the next presidential election.
First, given KMT Chairman Lien Chan's (連戰) refusal to step down to take responsibility for the electoral loss on March 20 and his attempt to consolidate his leadership by proposing a merger between the KMT and the People First Party (PFP), it now is up to Ma and Wang, the KMT's two leading heavyweights, to step out and launch a power transition.
So far, Ma and Wang have seemed to put their bets on another KMT loss in December's legislative elections. However, the price of letting Lien ruin the KMT again is a huge burden that both Ma and Wang cannot undertake. The question is, do they have the guts to challenge Lien right now? Apparently the time is not ripe for them to reveal concrete moves toward the chairmanship, let alone the path toward the presidency.
The second element involves the possible effects of a KMT-PFP merger. For the short term, since the KMT and the PFP have had various "exit strategies" in dealing with what they characterized as the "illegitimate" DPP administration, this complicates the potential approaches that a KMT-PFP hybrid might take.
The latest public opinion poll conducted by Formosa Survey Research and released by Taiwan Advocates showed that the two-month-long protest and resistance campaign launched by the pan-blue alliance against President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) re-election has backfired, estranging many of its own supporters. Even Ma and Wang have expressed reservations on the hawkish strategy and warned the pan-blue camp not to be dragged into this political quicksand.
As KMT moderates, Ma and Wang have selectively supported decisions made by Lien regarding what the KMT would do about what it portrayed as an "unfair" election. Nor has either man fully endorsed Lien's plan to pursue a merger with James Soong's (
The third challenge facing Ma and Wang is dealing with a potential Soong candidacy, as speculation on Soong running in 2008 has not diminished. To some extent the PFP as a whole also needs Soong's personal charisma to extend its own support base. Lien's push for the merger will inevitably create a power struggle between Soong, Ma and Wang.
Finally, the competition between Ma and Wang constitutes their biggest challenge. Numerous pan-blue pundits look to Ma as the "the one" in 2008. Although Ma has been criticized for his lack of firmness and failure to organize a capable administrative team, he nonetheless continues to enjoy popularity and media favor. Ironically, Ma's main weakness lies largely in his prudence, as he often misses opportunities to take the initiative.
On the other hand, Wang was born a politician and raised from the rank-and-file. His grass-roots personality and Taiwanese ethnicity earned him much support in southern Taiwan. He is good at political maneuvering, but lacks executive experience.
Given that both have different ideas on the timing and tactics for their candidacies, can they establish a joint ticket in 2008? They would be the perfect combination for the pan-blue camp in terms of compensating for each other. Yet the lure of being boss will decrease the chance that they will do so.
Liu Kuan-teh is a political commentator based in Taipei.
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