On May 17, China issued its latest statement on the Taiwan issue, now dubbed "Hu's Seven Points." President Chen Shui-bian's (
The question of whether these two statements have something in common and whether they offer feasible ways of improving the cross-strait relationship, or whether the two sides are sticking to their own interpretation and may even be causing the relationship to deteriorate, must be answered through objective, rational and cautious analysis.
The American China expert Kenneth Lieberthal does not believe that China's statement implies a policy change. He says there is nothing new in the statement's tough approach to Taiwan's independence, and that it is consistent with China's past attitudes.
The statement did not mention unification or the "one country, two systems" model. Instead, it focused on the establishment of a long-term stable framework that it hopes will resuscitate cross-strait exchanges and dialogue.
Lieberthal believes the Chen government should seriously study the possibilities for such interaction. If it doesn't, a future deterioration of the situation would spell disaster for both Taiwan and China. Lieberthal also says the current problem is that China thinks Taiwan's acceptance of the "one China" principle is the premise for such a framework. This is the reality. Taiwan has to give substantial and serious consideration to the meaning of a "one China" to which both China and Taiwan belong.
I often disagree with Lieberthal's point of view, but I think these arguments are pertinent and to the point. At first glance, the "five absolute noes" in the first half of China's statement -- "never compromise on the one-China principle, never give up our efforts for peace negotiations, never falter in our sincere pursuit of peace and development on both sides of the Strait with our Taiwan compatriots, never waver in our resolve to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and never accept `Taiwan independence'" -- seem overbearing, but a closer look reveals that they are but reiterations of past statements.
The statement warns "Taiwan leaders" that they must "pull back immediately from their dangerous lurch towards independence" instead of "following their separatist agenda to cut Taiwan from the rest of China and, in the end, meet their own destruction by playing with fire."
The statement goes on to say that "the Chinese people are not afraid of ghosts, nor will they be intimidated by brutal force. To the Chinese people, nothing is more important and more sacred than safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country. We will do our utmost with the maximum sincerity to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification of the motherland. However, if Taiwan's leaders should move recklessly to provoke major incidents of `Taiwan independence,' the Chinese people will crush their schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost."
Such saber-rattling has been heard before, but this time it is all being put in one and the same statement, and that sounds frightening to anyone who has never heard it before.
Nor are the seven points in the second half of China's statement very new. They have all been mentioned before, and they are also based on the "one China" premise: "No matter who holds power in Taiwan in the next four years, as long as they recognize that there is only one China in the world and both China and Taiwan belong to that one and same China, abandon the `Taiwan Independence' stance and stop the separatist activities, then cross-strait relations can hold out a bright prospect of peace, stability and development ..."
This is of course unacceptable to us. However, this first unambigious listing of these seven points does not mention "Jiang's Eight Points" or the "one country, two systems" model.
It is also the first time in four years that China has clearly undertaken the "resumption of cross-strait dialogue and negotiations, formal ending of the state of hostility through equal-footed consultations, establishing a mechanism of mutual trust in the military field, and jointly building a framework for peaceful, stable and growing cross-Strait relations."
This is tantamount to recognizing the Chen government and displaying China's desire to engage with Chen. This really is a new policy development.
Chen's inauguration speech of course could not please everyone, but a balanced view should note that it satisfied Taiwan, calmed the US and left China with no excuses.
The White House said it was a responsible and constructive inauguration speech, and welcomed its message in the hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would take this opportunity to resume dialogue as soon as possible. Given China's standard reaction, Beijing's dissatisfaction with Chen for not accepting the "one China" principle was anticipated.
However, China could not complain about him putting the constitutional change or national title issues to a referendum. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strong warning to the US for its positive assessment of Chen's speech, saying that the US must recognize the deceitfulness of the Taiwanese authorities, and that it must not send wrong signals to Taiwan. China's Ministry of Foreign affairs also pointed out that Chen only changed his wording after being subjected to heavy pressure, and that his refusal to accept the "one China" principle and his fundamental stance on Taiwan independence remain unchanged.
The China policy appearing in Chen's speech consisted of saying that "We can understand why the government on the other side of the Strait, in light of historical complexities and ethnic sentiments, cannot relinquish the insistence on the `one China' principle.
"By the same token, the Beijing authorities must understand the deep conviction held by the people of Taiwan to strive for democracy, to love peace, to pursue their dreams free from threat, and, to embrace progress.
"But if the other side is unable to comprehend ... the aspiration of Taiwan's 23 million people, if it continues to threaten Taiwan with military force, if it persists in isolating Taiwan diplomatically, if it keeps up irrational efforts to blockade Taiwan's rightful participation in the international arena, this will only serve to drive the hearts of the Taiwanese people further away and widen the divide in the Strait."
Chen further said that "Taiwan is a completely free and democratic society. Neither single individuals nor a political party can make the ultimate choice for the people.
"If both sides are willing, on the basis of goodwill, to create an environment engendered upon `peaceful development and freedom of choice,' then in the future, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China -- or Taiwan and China -- can seek to establish relations in any form whatsoever. We would not exclude any possibility, so long as there is the consent of the 23 million people of Taiwan."
He also reiterated "the promises and principles set forth in my inaugural speech in 2000. Those commitments have been honored -- they have not changed over the past four years, nor will they change in the next four years."
If neither Hu nor Chen display any goodwill, nor the will to improve the cross-strait relationship, then Beijing will persist in the "five absolute noes" part of "Hu's seven points" and Chen will continue insisting on calling a referendum on the constitutional and the national title issues, with both sides continuing to ignore each other and maintaining the status quo. I think that would be perfectly acceptable. Both sides could refuse to give each other political recognition and refuse contact with each other, maintaining the current situation for the next four years, 10 years, or even 20 years.
But if Hu and Chen really want to display their goodwill and if they intend to improve the cross-strait relationship, seeds for dialogue can be found in both Beijing's May 17 statement and Chen's May 20 inauguration speech. My logic and substantial policy suggestions are as follows.
First, Hu should clarify the "one China" principle. "Hu's seven points" did not include the sentence "There is only one China in the world, and China and Taiwan are both part of that same China," but Beijing keeps stressing that the government of the People's Republic of China is the only legal Chinese government. This is a problem and it does not make sense, because it makes the Republic of China on Taiwan an illegal government, and that is unacceptable to us.
Only by saying that both governments are legal under the "one China" principle would Hu be making a reasonable statement that describes reality. Only if he did so, would the seventh point -- "Properly addressing, through consultations, the issue of international living space of the Taiwan region commensurate with its status so as to share the dignity of the Chinese nation" -- be substantially feasible and acceptable to Taiwan.
More realistically and concretely, following the examples set by the former Soviet Union, Germany and North and South Korea, both the PRC and the ROC should be members of the UN under the "one China" principle. The question of whether the two will unite in future is a possibility that we, as Chen said, do not exclude.
These are not empty words, but rather a statement of constructive policy where both verbal promises and actual benefits converge. Excluding Taiwan from the UN and only agreeing to the possibility of Taiwan participating in the World Health Organization as an observer are deceitful tricks unacceptable to Taiwan.
If Hu and Chen have the will, these concrete policy suggestions should be central to a solution of the Taiwan Straits dispute. Based on the "one China" premise, this might be the only solution that could be accepted as reasonable and fair by a majority of the Taiwanese people. The success of such a solution will depend on the wisdom of Hu Jintao and Chen Shui-bian.
Chiou Chwei-liang is a visiting professor at the Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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