Three days before President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) inauguration, China's Taiwan Affairs Office announced its latest policy toward Taiwan. The statement was not so much intimidation aimed at influencing Chen's inauguration speech as it was a clarification of the upper and lower limits of Beijing's cross-strait policy: It was an attempt to improve the relationship.
First, in the statement, the Taiwan Affairs Office obviously recognized the fact that Chen had won re-election and was trying to start new interactions with the new government. Beijing harshly criticized Chen for backing away from his "five noes" commitment, which signaled China's hope that Chen mentions the "five noes" again in his inauguration speech.
But China did not bring up its aspiration to exchange ideas with Taiwan's political parties on the cross-strait relationship and peaceful reunification in the statement. This indicated Beijing's willingness to interact with the new Taiwanese government in a more pragmatic way, rather than using the opposition parties to isolate the ruling party.
Next, Beijing responded to Chen's proposal about a framework for peace and stability in the statement, showing that it already regarded Chen as a legitimate dialogue partner.
Finally, Beijing clearly prescribed the lower limit of its cross-strait policy in the statement. It identified three causes of the current crisis: the nation's backing away from the "five noes" commitment, its rhetoric "inciting a confrontation" with China and its "heading toward independence" by way of writing a new constitution. Four years ago, China criticized Chen's inauguration speech for lacking sincerity on pushing the "five noes" policy forward; now, it has criticized Chen for breaking his promises regarding the policy. China obviously hopes that Chen will commit himself to practicing the ideas in the "five noes."
China said in the statement that it would work for peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait. It also said that if Taiwan's leaders should move recklessly to provoke "major incidents" in the name of Taiwan's independence, the Chinese people would crush their schemes thoroughly at any cost. At the same time, China does not view Taiwan's rejection of the "one China" principle as a pro-independence claim, which is a very different attitude from four years ago.
Obviously, Beijing tried to strike a new balance in the cross-strait relationship -- one not only acceptable to both sides but also feasible in maintaining cross-strait peace and stability. Beijing therefore has made its wish very clear that as long as Taiwan adheres to a certain minimum standard in its policies, cross-strait stability can be maintained.
The statement also set the upper bounds of China's current policy toward Taiwan -- not immediate reunification but peaceful and stable cross-strait development based on the "one China" principle. There wasn't a word in the entire document referring to political negotiations for reunification. Instead, it responded to a framework proposed by Chen for peaceful and stable interaction between two sides. This means that between the polarized options of independence and unification, China is willing to work with Taiwan to develop an interaction framework for peace.
Under the current circumstances, where Taiwan and China lack mutual trust and communication, Beijing chose to announce on the eve of Chen's inauguration that it hopes that Chen knows he is regarded as the legitimate dialogue partner during his new term by China. So China has shown its cards. Now it's Chen's turn to respond in his inauguration speech.
Tung Chen-yuan is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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