What exactly can we expect from President Chen Shui-bian's (
The younger generation in the Democratic Progressive Party suggested that Chen incorporate some new cultural ideas to embrace the "Republic of China" factions to bridge the Taiwan-China dichotomy and pursue national reconciliation. The more fundamentalist pro-independence ideologues argued that Chen needed to keep pursuing sovereignty and stick to his plan of holding a referendum to push for a new constitution.
The president is not only being pressured locally; the US has also applied tremendous influence to prevent Chen sending the wrong message to China. The context and process of constitutional reform are the main concern in Washington's constant reminders to the Chen administration.
Not to mention that Beijing has already denounced Chen's inauguration and is portraying his proposal of establishing a peace and stability framework across the Taiwan Strait as nothing but a lie. Let's not rule out the possibility of China sabotaging Taiwan's bid for observer status in the World Health Assembly on May 17 as a gift for Chen's inauguration.
All these elements pose severe challenges to Chen. To what extent can he deliver a speech, as he has proposed, that would satisfy the domestic audience and please both the George W. Bush administration and the international community at large, while at the same time giving Beijing no excuse to accuse him of damaging cross-strait relations?
Chen's inaugural speech should entail at least three elements when it touches upon relations with China and the US. He must acknowledge that Taiwan has gone through a contested election and, most importantly, a hard battle for democracy. He has a strong belief that electoral disputes can be resolved through judicial processes. Therefore, preserving democracy in Taiwan should transcend partisan differences and serve as the nation's highest goal. In the face of China's continued antagonism against him, Chen should take a moderate approach and utilize the principle of democracy and peace to win over international support. While stressing the common cultural heritage shared by China and Taiwan, Chen could make a pledge to the international community that he supports a peaceful resolution of the differences between the two countries.
Offering an olive branch to his counterpart does not mean making concessions. The message that Chen should send to Beijing is that people on both sides of the strait should make a joint effort to demonstrate to the world that their common heritage is not a burden, but a solid pillar on which to build decent and stable self-government.
Finally, Chen must convince Washington that he would not take advantage of the friendship between Taiwan and the US, and that his proposed constitutional reforms are aimed at improving government efficiency. These reforms will have no bearing on changing the status quo, nor on altering the name or territory of the country. The US went through a similar test of fire 200 years ago when it created a federal constitution that has governed American democracy for two centuries.
Changing the constitution is obviously important. It is something to be welcomed, not something to be feared. And while the US constitution has proved to be a remarkably effective document, it has nevertheless been amended several times. Constitutional changes should never be undertaken lightly, but neither should they be avoided if they will help to deepen the very democracy a constitution is meant to serve.
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