As the presidential inauguration approaches, the whole world, especially the US and China, is carefully watching to see what messages President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) will deliver in his inaugural speech that might affect Taipei-Washington-Beijing relations.
Washington is not simply waiting around for Chen to elaborate on his agenda for a new constitution by 2006. The Bush administration is making a tremendous effort to exert its influence -- through diplomatic pressure as well as through the media -- to redirect Chen's cross-strait policy.
At the heart of US concerns is how Chen will manage cross-strait relations while rewriting the Constitution, but without giving the impression that he is unilaterally changing the status quo.
The Bush administration has so far found Chen's rationale for implementing constitutional revision through referendums unconvincing. There are clearly limits to what the US will support when it comes to constitutional reform. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly told a hearing on Capitol Hill that "the US does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it." In other words, the US will watch every step Chen makes, and will feel free to comment whenever it feels he is crossing the line.
But can the status quo be solely judged by what Taiwan can and cannot do? What about the authoritarian regime across the Taiwan Strait that has never renounced the use of force against this nation? The "status quo" is a growing number of missiles deployed along China's southeastern coast targeting Taiwan. The status quo is Beijing's relentless effort to sabotage Taiwan's sovereignty by promoting its ideas of "one China" and "one country, two systems."
It is China's relentless saber-rattling and diplomatic squeezing that has lead to a growing anti-China sentiment and the rise of Taiwanese consciousness. This is the origin of potential changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
Washington may ignore the danger inherent in Beijing's efforts to restrain Taiwan, but it should not portray Chen's efforts to consolidate democracy as an attempt to pursue independence. Chen reiterated during the recent election campaign that a new constitution would not change the status quo or the name and territory of the Republic of China. Washington should trust Taiwan and show it more respect if Chen incorporates such a pledge in his May 20 speech.
The Bush administration has long argued that Beijing is a lot more uncontrollable than Taiwan and therefore Taipei should refrain from rocking the boat. This notion is neither persuasive nor respectful of Taiwan's democratization. The double standards of the US are clear: it treats Taiwan's democratically elected president as a reckless troublemaker while sycophantically hosting China's leaders. It should apologize to the people of Taiwan for trying to deprive them of their right to say no to China.
Taipei and Washington should work on strengthen-ing bilateral communication over the next four years. The Bush administration must also contemplate the extent to which the US could strike a balance between safeguarding its national interests and those of democratic Taiwan while trying to build constructive and candid relations with China.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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