On Thursday, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage announced in a televised interview that the US has some specific hopes regarding the May 20 inauguration speech of President Chen Shui-bian (
High-ranking Presidential Office staff members immediately indicated in private that the so-called "five noes" pledge will be reiterated in the inauguration speech, although not in exactly the same words.
Because this all came about after a US visit by Presidential Office Secretary-General Chiou I-Jen (
Reviewing Chen's first term, despite controversies and debates regarding the cross-strait policy, it is safe to conclude that he kept his word. Neither Lee's "special state-to-state" discourse nor Chen's own talk about "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait, which many deem to be a continuation of Lee's policy, have been incorporated into the Constitution. The defensive referendum held simultaneously with the presidential election, which had supposedly caused much concern in the US, had nothing to do with the independence-unification issue.
However, does this mean that the cross-strait status quo has been maintained? Obviously this is not the case. For one, consistent with the rise of nativist consciousness in Taiwan in past decades, the Taiwanese sense of national identity has reached an all-time high -- although many still feel that there is a long way to go in this regard. This is demonstrated by Chen's electoral defeat of KMT Chairman Lien Chan (
Moreover, one can hardly argue that the cross-strait status quo is being maintained when the imbalance between the military powers on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has reached a new extreme. This was confirmed by US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly during a congressional hearing last week, in which he said that over the past 25 years China has repeatedly reassured the US of its willingness to peacefully resolve the Taiwan issue, but in practice it has continued to increase the number of missiles targeting Taiwan by 50 to 75 each year.
So while all expectations are on Taiwan to exercise self-restraint, which Taiwan has largely done, what is being done to keep China from losing control? Can anything be done to accomplish that goal?
If maintaining the status quo means that Taiwan cannot have any presence in the international community -- even when sensitive sovereignty issues are not touched, as in the inability of Taiwan to merely obtain observer status as a "health entity" -- it is no wonder that the popular will in Taiwan is hungrily looking for other options.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰) are expected to meet this month in Paris to prepare for a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). According to media reports, the two sides would discuss issues such as the potential purchase of Boeing aircraft by China, increasing imports of US soybeans and the latest impacts of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs. However, recent US military action against Iran has added uncertainty to the Trump-Xi summit. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) called the joint US-Israeli airstrikes and the