We are less than two weeks away from the presidential election. Both sides have made campaign promises. Ignoring the question of whether these concrete promises will be realized, let's make an overall assessment of what the new political and economic situation in Taiwan will be depending on whether the pan-blue or pan-green ticket wins.
A win by President Chen Shui-bian (
It would become possible to carry out reforms with greater boldness and resolution, and the economy, already improving as a result of external factors, would grow even stronger following the implementation of the 10 Major Infrastructure Projects. We can already see the recent strength of the stock market's performance, which leads the economy.
As for the cross-strait relationship, China continues to exercise its evil influence, but it will in the end have to face reality and strike up a dialogue with the DPP. Legislative elections of course mean contradictions between the two green-camp parties, the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). However, given that a strong local awareness is the fundamental ideal of both parties, and that there is still a great difference in real power between the two, these contradictions will not be too great.
Diplomatically speaking, because the referendum avoids the unification/independence issue, the US' worries and China's strong reaction have already subsided, but the government still wants to mend the Taiwan-US relationship in order to build mutual faith, in particular as the result of the US presidential election still is an unknown variable. A win by Chen would make that an even more difficult task. Pro-Taiwanese forces in Japan will kick up a fuss and increase the pressure on the Japanese government's pro-Chinese policies.
But a win by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Lien Chan (
Because of Soong's outstanding vote record in the 2000 presidential election, both he and his party members feel wronged by his having to condescend to accepting the vice presidential seat. They are therefore determined that they should be rewarded with the most important post, that of premier, and an increased influence on policy-making. In addition to PFP members, there is also the possibility that at least some people in the KMT will side with Soong on the issue.
This means that there is not a great possibility of Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) getting that post, and he may only get the KMT chairmanship. It is also difficult to say whether he will be able to hold on to the speakership following the year-end legislative elections.
The KMT and the PFP will also have difficulty taking a unified approach to both the allocation of Cabinet posts and the legislative elections, and we are certain to witness a fierce struggle between the two parties. KMT bureaucrats are more conservative and glib, and more concerned about personal political relationships. This is not the case in the PFP, the members of which are younger, more hardworking, and full of ambition. This can be seen from their malicious political style, the way they balk at nothing and their disregard for national security issues, which is also the reason why they split from the KMT. This will become a big headache for the KMT.
The KMT-PFP split highlighted the cross-strait relationship. The strength of the KMT's localization faction stopped the party from going too far on the "one China" issue, but Soong has to this day not changed his mind on the "one China under one roof" idea. Beijing must be raising the price for clandestinely helping Lien and Soong's campaign.
Because both Lien and Wang have been smeared in various degrees by wavering over the "one China" issue, China will support the PFP in the struggle between the KMT and the PFP, thereby giving the PFP the upper hand when it is time to divide Cabinet seats and make cross-strait policy.
On economic issues, the KMT and the PFP are taking advantage of the economic revival by claim-ing all the credit for themselves. But it is hard to say whether it would be a good or a bad thing if they were to come up with some fancy new ideas on economic policy in order to highlight their own achievements.
On foreign policy, because the PFP is closer to China than the KMT is, their criticism of the Chen government's US diplomacy is especially strong. Unlike Lien, Soong does not travel to Washington to show goodwill towards the US by, for example, agreeing to purchase US military equipment if elected. There will thus also be differences between Lien's and Soong's policies on the Taiwan-US relationship.
It is strange that although Soong sent his son to the US to give himself room for retreat, he has never said anything positive about the US. He clearly does not want to offend Beijing, and he will therefore be friendlier towards China than towards the US. Soong's leanings toward China will speed up the process of Sinicizing Taiwan.
The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing will be a moment of crucial importance for Taiwan. In the period leading up to the event, Beijing will apply heavy pressure, using every trick in the book to make Taiwan participate in the games as a local government entity. That period will also see yet another presidential election in Taiwan. Will some pan-blue camp politicians uncertain of election get the idea that, rather than ending up with nothing, they could maintain their power by becoming a [Hong Kong-style] chief executive? When that happens, it will become necessary to hold a referendum in order to give a voice to public opinion. That is why the upcoming nationwide referendum is so important.
Paul Lin is a commentator based in New York.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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