There is at this writing an unusual atmosphere in the US-Taiwan relationship. It's not the first time there have been differences.
Most of the time these problems are resolved. Sometimes they are not, causing some bruises on both sides. The present one can go either way. Since my articles are read in both Taipei and Washington, I want to make clear that these thoughts are entirely my own, with no inside information to support them from either side of the problem. Both sides seem to be pushing their objective too quickly. It may benefit China, but not America or Taiwan.
Let me start with the American side. China has not been very successful in influencing Taiwan's political process. It doesn't have the wherewithal to force their policy on that nation. So they have turned to the Americans to pressure Taiwan to do China's bidding.
America has for 50 years avoided getting in the middle of the cross-strait issue, though each side wanted it as long as it favored their side. China experts in the US have for years jumped at any time China threatens Taiwan.
The experts' record has not been exemplary on this score, but it can never be simply dismissed. Furthermore, leading a global effort to control a very misty but very dangerous threat -- terrorism -- is America's first priority so problems elsewhere may not get much attention.
We must remember, however, that America, like Taiwan, is preparing for a presidential election, although it has more time before the critical date.
American opposition to any referendum, as was stated initially, would not be politically saleable (especially as Californians were then debating one in their typical high-profile fashion). So America backed off on all referendums, but retained opposition to the "defensive referendum," which is the only kind Taiwan's president can invoke.
The first question is why did America agree to oppose referendums, and if there was sufficient rationale for doing China's wishes, the second one is what did America get in return. Was it a "pig in the poke?" There are doubtless many thoughts on this, but mine is why not insist on China agreeing to a formal dialogue with Taiwan, without pre-conditions, and now, as a quid-pro-quo.
That has been an American objective for some time. There would be little chance for any real progress in resolving the problems between the two sides in the immediate future, but it would at least make clear that the US would not continue to be a middleman.
The US would also not be seen as interfering in the Taiwan political campaign.
And in Taiwan the people are passing through a very important and significant period in their history. Especially the younger generation who have grown up in the democratic atmosphere that now exists there. They increasingly see themselves as Taiwanese. Greater emphasis is put on education, to assure a greater knowledge and understanding of Taiwan itself as opposed to the exclusive emphasis on China.
At the same time the government is pursuing a consensus on Taiwan's national identity. It is an objective that has been discussed for years, and it persists in the give and take of democratic politics, but seems to become stronger every year, regardless of whatever government.
The polls, in addition, indicate very strong changes in the attitudes of the people of Taiwan regarding how they identify themselves. Those that identify themselves as "Taiwanese" have risen to about 42 percent, with another similar figure for those who select both "Taiwanese and Chinese." Those who identify as only "Chinese" have dropped to about 10 percent. The demographic change inevitably has brought a considerable change to its politics.
The gist of the Taiwan government's idea of having a "defensive referendum" is that it should involve a not very gentle message to China.
On that basis, important countries, including America, have voiced their concern. In addition to the positive impact for the president this would presumably have with regard to the election, other benefits also are important. There are concerns domestically that there is little sense of urgency in facing up to the threats Taiwan faces among the increasingly important and growing number of younger voters.
In addition to the forthcoming election, there are important objectives for a referendum that goes beyond one person's campaign, and that seems to be understood even by the opposition.
A possible compromise could be accomplished by making the security needs of the country the base of a referendum. It is a subject that falls under the law, and does not so visibly provoke China.
But it would cause the voters to involve themselves in considering their security needs and would set a precedent on the right to have referendums.
There are already studies by both Taiwan and the US on the need for strengthening domestic defenses in Taiwan.
A referendum might ask if the public would agree that the central, county and local governments devote a set percentage of their income on government-approved projects for home defense, including the threat of missiles. Every locality could be required to have a local volunteer home security council to oversee and annually report up through the levels of government to the central authority.
This would be seen as leading the people into a greater awareness of Taiwan's security without including China directly, and not involving any change to the status quo (as it now seems to be interpreted).
The purpose of these ideas, and those from others that may want to express their vision, is compromise.
The US and Taiwan have both taken a public stand. They both need to be accommodated. Years ago, during another strain in US-Taiwan relations, then president Lee Teng-hui (
I believe the results could have been better managed, to the benefit of all three countries, if the prior debate and discussions had led to compromise among two friends.
That may be the case today.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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