The White House has retreated from its doctrine of regime change and pre-emptive military action and is returning to traditional diplomacy in an effort to repackage US President George W. Bush as a president for peace.
Signs of the new strategy that have emerged in the past few weeks include:
? North Korea, where authorities on Friday agreed to allow US inspectors to visit its nuclear complex this week.
? Iran, where the US proposed, through UN channels, sending a high-level humanitarian mission after the Dec. 26 earthquake -- although Tehran on Friday asked for any visit to be delayed.
? Libya, where the US welcomed Muammar Qaddafi's surprise decision to give up weapons of mass destruction.
? Iraq, where the Bush administration is pressing for greater involvement from the international community.
? Palestine, where US peace envoy John Wolf may be sent to try to restart talks.
The signs of a thaw in US relations with these and other countries point to a different approach emerging in Washington. It emphasizes cooperation, dialogue and diplomacy in place of the policies that have characterized the Bush administration's thinking to date. While Bush publicly asserts Washington's right to defend its interests by any means, in practice he is increasingly pursuing a collaborative approach.
"There is a definite shift in US policy in everything but words," said Joseph Cirincione, an arms control expert. "The official doctrine has not changed but all our actions have, and the result is a shift away from military action toward diplomatic engagement. First with Iran, then with Libya and now with North Korea, we see a much greater effort to affect changes in regime behavior rather than changes of regime."
Analysts in Washington say the Bush administration has little choice if it is to fulfil a highly ambitious election year agenda that seeks to disarm "rogue states" such as North Korea while advancing toward a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, encouraging conflict resolution in Sudan, and achieving credible transformations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
All these objectives are complicated and to some degree hindered by the "war on terror" against a resurgent al-Qaeda, and by America's failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.
Despite notable successes in overthrowing and capturing former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, White House hopes of bringing democratic governance in Iraq and Afghanistan hang in the balance amid continuing violence and discord.
Iraq is crucial to the administration's policy shift -- either because, as conservatives argue, leaders of other rogue regimes learnt a lesson from Saddam's fate, or, as others say, because the conflict has so extended the military, Washington cannot contemplate the opening of a new front.
"It's just the force of reality, the consequences of Iraq, which has made them change," said Anatol Lieven, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Even by their standards it is not rational to think that America can run another war."
With elections 11 months away, Bush does not want to be vulnerable to claims that he has presided over a warmongering strategy that has left Americans little safer than they were on Sept. 11, 2001.
His shift follows an established pattern in Washington of politicians moving to the center during an election year.
But Bush has an additional consideration with Iraq. He is keenly aware that the electorate's judgment of his performance depends heavily on events there. Despite a rally in his popularity after Saddam's capture two weeks ago, opinion polls suggest overall attitudes toward the war have not fundamentally changed. Public concern at American casualties in Iraq has continued to rise and, ominously for Bush, the violence in Iraq has not lessened.
White House policy is also being influenced by Washington's allies, notably Britain. After the chasms over Iraq, the US and the Europeans seem to have reached an understanding about the right mix of diplomacy and force -- particularly during negotiations with Iran and Libya.
The change in direction is also a result of the constant struggle for influence between pragmatists and hawks that has been a defining feature of the Bush administration. The neo-conservatives appear to be losing ground, with speculation about upcoming bureaucratic reshuffling.
"The state department pinstripes have replaced the department of defense bluster," Cirincione said.
The move to negotiated, diplomatic solutions is unlikely to be welcomed by the vice president, Dick Cheney, the most influential of Washington's hawks, who have often dominated policy-making.
But in an interview published this week, Secretary of State Colin Powell seemed to suggest the policy battle was finally going his way. Powell acknowledged that the administration's top priority in the coming months would be cooperative peace making, rather than war making.
"I'm going to work very hard in making clear to our friends in Europe and elsewhere in the world that America is a partner -- spend more time with them, spend more time listening to them and finding ways what we can cooperate together," Powell told the Washington Post.
On Iraq, Powell indicated that a switch in US policy was required. He said the UN and NATO had essential roles to play and the US needed to persuade other countries to forgive or reschedule Iraq's US$120 billion foreign debts.
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