Almost two months after the pan-green side announced its intention to establish referendums and remake the Constitution, China decided to go public with its concerns about the referendum and constitutional issues coming out of Taiwan.
This slow reaction may have been due to the normal political differences in the leadership that take some time to resolve. What triggered a decision, however, could well have been the turnaround on these issues by the opposition pan-blue side in Taiwan in the midst of the presidential election campaign.
This seems to have convinced China to more aggressively seek US support against Taiwan instead of the opposition Taiwanese parties. That is not the answer for China, nor is the threat of war. They should read US President George W. Bush's speech during his recent visit to the UK on the US' commitment to democracy. The answer is dialogue between the two sides of the Strait.
One can argue that Beijing's recent strategy with regard to Taiwan has been to refrain from public opposition to the present administration (which was seen as having been counterproductive in the past), and to support the opposition (which was seen as more friendly to China). It is too early to tell just what the platform on both sides in Taiwan will say in detail on these two issues, but it is assumed that China will still see the opposition as a better choice for them. Though the differences between the two opposing parties on the substance of these issues has diminished considerably, their objectives remain unchanged.
There has been much speculation in the Taiwanese media as to why this sudden change in the pan-blues' platform came about.
Clearly one factor is that the issues presented by the Democratic Progressive Party were seen as very positive by the people. Any opposition could not afford to ignore that, and perhaps they hope they can direct the changes inherent in the issues in a direction they prefer. In any event, the action by the opposition has shifted the center of the political spectrum much more toward a separate identity. Even under the best of circumstances, China will not gain as much as they thought. So some fiery noises started to come out of China. Some shrill words from past efforts got dusted off and released.
In the US, the Bush administration reacted differently from many of the think tanks. The latter focused on the danger of an unhappy China. A military confrontation such as occurred in 1995 and 1996 might occur with all the consequences that could follow.
Knowing that no one on any side favors such a possibility, the US administration's first concern, it seems, was to let Beijing know publicly that use of force was not an option. On Nov. 18 Richard Armitage, US deputy secretary of state, said in answer to a question that "the question of Taiwan will be resolved peacefully, and it is on this premise that we base our policy regarding Taiwan and the People's Republic of China." This statement was by no means bellicose, but it was an important reminder of what was at stake.
Two days later, Randy Schriver, US deputy assistant secretary, stressed at a press briefing the US' position of neutrality, but also the US position on the use of force. He said that, "Whether to pursue a referendum, whether to alter the constitution, is really a matter of Taiwan domestic politics." On the question of Taiwan's status, he said, "We have been clear, and we do have equities and we do have views."
The next day, in Beijing, an interview was given to The Washington Post by Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶). Judging from the transcript of the interview, on the subject of Taiwan, there was quite a different atmosphere. The premier lashed out at the Taiwanese leadership. There was nothing new in the harsh language he used to assert they would not brook a separate Taiwan. The "one China principle" and "one country, two systems" were "rock solid." He also referred to the "principles" of the Three Communiques in "opposing" Taiwanese independence.
There were two elements of interest, however. He twice referred to the "deliberate provocation on the referendum issue and writing a constitution." They unilaterally continue to define, add to or change (with considerable success) just what provocation is. The other is the several statements directed at the US: "We hope that the US government will recognize the gravity and danger of the provocative remarks and actions ... we hope that the US side would take practical measures ... the US side must be crystal clear in opposing the use of a referendum or writing a constitution or all other tactics."
There is nothing new about asking for US assistance in influencing Taiwan, but it is increasingly done more openly. In addition, requests such as opposing the use of a referendum, and rewriting the Constitution, follow a public statement by the US that such matters are domestic Taiwanese politics. Doubtless, both the US and China were setting markers useful for Wen's upcoming visit.
China seems bent on making the US responsible for the changes taking place in Taiwan. Clearly they wish to generate support in the US for the idea that US support for the democratic process is not practical.
One element of this state of affairs that is not often considered is Beijing's refusal to conduct a dialogue with the present administration in Taipei. The US has often encouraged such a dialogue, but China refuses on the basis that it distrusts President Chen Shui-bian (
However, in the early years of the new administration in Taipei, there were efforts at starting a dialogue, and there was a major opening of economic relations with China that was controversial in the ruling party.
These and statements that indicate some softening of Taiwan's positions were also controversial, but received little if any response. It was clear that Beijing saw any dialogue as strengthening Chen's position, and opted for influencing the next presidential election.
At the same time, the greater opening of commerce with China has, despite there being no response on what is seen in Taiwan as possible concessions, weakened the ruling party's base. Now that the time for election campaigning has come, the party inevitably has had to address the demands of its base constituency. So the present circumstances that are now being so vigorously played to the international community and the US as "moving toward independence" are largely a result of Beijing's ignorance of the democratic process.
Pressing for direct dialogue between Taiwan and China and avoiding the continuous verbal jujitsu, where ambiguity is standard practice and little is accomplished, seems the most practical road to follow.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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