President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) proposed a timetable for the creation of a new constitution during the Democratic Progres-sive Party's (DPP) 15th anniversary celebrations. We should note, however, the muted reaction from opposition parties, the US and China, the media and the DPP's ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union.
Media opinion polls show this is not an urgent matter. But when this plan is implemented, electoral democracy, previously focused on transferring power between political parties, will enter a new realm -- the referendum becomes another democratic channel, and a new constitution becomes the goal for political development.
Talk of a new constitution will have an immediate impact on the content of a referendum law. The opposition has kept the referendum issue a public-policy issue, and the pan-blue alliance has said that referendums should be initiated through public signature drives, thus depriving the executive of the right to initiate a referendum and eliminating consultative referendums.
But the issue of a new constitution affects the public referendum channel. The proposed referendum law (公投法) must leave room for a referendum regarding a new constitution and allow for public participation.
This issue has clearly managed to specify the presidential election agenda since the focus of the election has turned towards symbolic issues such as presidential power, constitutional politics and even the movement to change Taiwan's name.
The unwillingness of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) leaders to respond may be the correct approach in the short term, but continued silence will hurt their presidential image and raise questions as to whether there will be a reaction from the Chinese Communist Party.
In the long term, a new constitution will indeed change the status quo, in particular when it comes to adjusting inequalities in the US-China-Taiwan relationship. Chen's "Five No's" promised self-restraint in exchange for security and stability, but as he is trying to win a second term, it has instead turned into a mistake.
The US keeps reiterating the "Five No's" trying to restrict Chen's behavior, with the opposition and China silently chiming in. The constitutional issue has led to Chen being able to cast off the "Five No's" strait-jacket. Just like the movement to change Taiwan's name, it has demystified independence and made question of including the "state-to-state" model of cross-strait relations in the Constitution irrelevant.
The original direction of Tai-wan's democratization process was not to match the constitutional issue with a referendum. In the past, transformation came through compromise, with frequent meetings on issues of national concern. Government and opposition cooperated to amend the Constitution and this is why we today have an electoral democracy.
The longing for authoritarianism proves that this electoral democracy is incapable of solving fundamental issues. When demo-cracy is diminished to a mere matter of elections, the transfer of government power merely becomes distribution of power between political parties. Public frustrations are transformed into doubts of the democratic system. This is a problem that cannot be addressed by any number of changes in government.
The creation of a new constitution could deteriorate into just another campaign trick. This, together with the orientation of political leaders, will be the biggest motivating power deciding the question of whether the referendum will become a new channel for the democratic participation of the people.
Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant research fellow at the Sun Yat-Sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy of the Academia Sinica.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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