Expectations that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Treaty of Taipei may be incorporated into high-school textbooks -- alongside the Cairo and Potsdam declarations -- have sparked a debate on the claim that Taiwan's status remains unsettled. I would like to give some background on this theory.
On Feb. 14, 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed a "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance," which proved that Beijing was leaning toward the Soviets. On June 25 that year, North Korea invaded South Korea. In succession, the US and China entered the war. The military clash between the US and China on the Korean Peninsula made the US understand Taiwan's strategic value in containing the expansion of Chinese and Soviet communists in East Asia.
Then US president Harry Truman announced that the US Seventh Fleet would prevent any attack on Taiwan. To legalize such an action and to avoid criticism of interference in China's internal affairs, Truman stated that Taiwan's future status would not be determined until peace was restored in the Pacific region, a peace treaty was signed with Japan and the matter was reviewed by the UN. This was the origin of the theory that Taiwan's status remains unsettled.
As for the question of where Taiwan's sovereignty belongs, Article 2 (b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Article 2 of the Treaty of Taipei only stated that Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores. There was no mention whatsoever of these areas being returned to China. Then Japanese prime minister Shigeru Yoshida also said that Japan merely renounced its territorial rights over Taiwan and that the sovereignty issue remained undecided.
On Sept. 29, 1972, then Jap-anese prime minister Kakuei Tanaka and then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (
The Chinese demanded during the negotiations that Japan recognize Taiwan as PRC territory. However, in the communique establishing diplomatic ties, Japan only used ambiguous language, using the words "understand and respect" instead of "recognize."
Japan said that because it had renounced sovereignty rights over Taiwan, the Pescadores and other affiliated islands in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, it no longer had any legal ground on which to "recognize" that the sovereignty of areas that were no longer its territory belonged to the PRC. Based on this principle of international law, territorial rights can only be determined by the countries involved. They cannot be recognized or determined by any irrelevant third country.
The day after China and Japan established diplomatic ties, the Japanese government said -- in a statement by then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira at the Liberal Democratic Party's bicameral congressional meeting -- that Japan understood and respected Beijing's claim that Taiwan was an inseparable part of the PRC, but had not taken any stance recognizing such claim. Japan made it clear that the two countries' positions on the issue could never be unanimous.
At best, Japan could only equivocate politically and handle the issue with words like "understand and respect." At the same time, it also left room for maneuver in the development of Taiwan-Japan relations after the severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Ho Szu-shen is an associate professor in the department of Japanese at Fu Jen Catholic University.
Translated by Francis Huang
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of