While the media in Taiwan are increasingly preoccupied with next year's presidential election campaign, in the US there's only the occasional related item in the news. Think tanks have had a number of seminars on the subject, but at this time North Korea and China still dominate news from East Asia as well as the government's attention. The danger in this is that China and America, both of whom are distracted by other concerns, may be surprised and dismayed (for different reasons) by the election rhetoric heard from Taiwan.
China, having learned from experience that threats against Taiwan are counterproductive, may try other means to influence the course of an election -- by using America, for example, or by pressuring the international community (not to speak of other, less visible, methods). The US, on the other hand, well understands the role of boisterous rhetoric in a democratic election, but worries more about a reaction from China at a time when US-PRC cooperation on other issues such as North Korea are especially important to it.
China, whose system allows for only one voice, makes clear what it doesn't want -- another four years of President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) administration.
The US, whose policy on such matters is official neutrality, has many voices that favor either side of the election debate. Taiwan's dilemma is that the uncertainty, and the importance of where the country will go as a result of the election is shared by not only the governments of both its principal adversary and its strongest friend, but by the Taiwanese themselves.
After the election, China will have to address how to open a dialogue either with an uncertain but ideologically closer new government, or with a known government they dislike ideologically but whose leader has made commitments on cross-strait matters that leaders of a new government might find difficult to make. In either case, a new strategy for cross-strait relations will be needed.
As for the US, after the election it will also have to adjust its strategies regarding its relationship with Taiwan, and perhaps for the East Asia region as well. The base of the strategies would probably stretch from one that envisions a closer relationship between Taiwan and China that could affect both America's economic and security interests, to one that envisions Taiwan remaining a separate entity in some form for the long term.
For Taiwan to openly address the national identity issue is fraught with difficulties, but not addressing it is sapping its ability to resolve almost every issue that confronts the nation. The heightened migration of large segments of industry to China, the growing strength of Beijing in the international community and the difficulties in addressing Taiwan's domestic concerns has made it clear that resolving this issue cannot be avoided. Without some resolution, every issue, every reform and every proposal becomes stalemated or compromised into irrelevancy.
As a democracy, Taiwan's means of resolving so important and sensitive an issue is through public debate and a vote. Sounds simple, but nothing on that issue is simple and nothing is more important. If this issue remains at the forefront of the coming election -- and it is possible both sides of the issue may shift the attention of voters to other more mundane matters -- a very important decision will be made.
The presidential election will feature four principle political parties (measured by their hold on legislative seats) that in reality make up two clearly distinct ideologies with two parties on each side. There are differences on some domestic issues between the two sides -- reform measures, for example -- and some issues may be given different priorities depending on the outcome -- the economy and security, for example. But the most important difference, and the major issue no matter how it is dressed, will be the question of national identity. One side sees Taiwan eventually becoming a part of "one China," while the other sees a Taiwan that has its own identity and sovereignty with some special arrangement with China.
A public debate on such an important issue in a democracy such as Taiwan's is noisy, heated and certainly high profile. Polls in Taiwan are often biased, including private and even foreign ones, and important constituencies are not factored in them. The Hakka vote, the 1 million new young voters, the influence of the newly formed "pan-purple alliance" and undecided voters could be deciding factors in a close vote.
China, even with its better understanding of Taiwan's democratic process, will have to use considerable restraint to avoid reacting to what they will say is provocative action or comments that will only strengthen the side it does not want to win. It has other priorities besides Taiwan, to be sure, but on the cross-strait issue its objective is unchallenged domestically and therefore more easily and effectively pursued.
The US, on the other hand, will be more understanding of the rhetoric but concerned about the possible reaction from China in the short term. What the election result will mean for US?Taiwan relations in the longer term may well be more important, however. A Taiwan that is closer to China or one that retains some form of separateness should be considered in both economic and security matters and the impact it will have on America's regional security interests. For all three -- Taiwan, the US and China -- a military conflict over the issue would be considered a disaster for each one of them.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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