The conference held in Taipei earlier this month regarding Hong Kong and the "one county, two systems" model was an unusual event. It had both a domestic and external dimension. Primarily, it was meant to be a wake-up call for Taiwanese to understand just what the model was and, if accepted, why it would destroy Taiwan's freedom. It also was an effort to support democracy in the Chinese world.
It was unusual for political personalities from Hong Kong to come to Taiwan and take part in a conference that clearly would be critical of Beijing and "one county, two systems." With the host being former president Lee Teng hui (李登輝), and President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) opening the conference with a speech, it was clearly going to be a high-profile event.
The intention of the Hong Kong visitors doubtless was to gain more support from abroad, and from democratic Taiwan. Taiwan in turn hoped not only to show public support for expanding democracy in Hong Kong, and to show that Taiwan's type of democracy works in a Chinese society, but mainly to emphasize the differences between a "one county, two systems" type of political freedom and Taiwan's "people's democracy."
One of the driving forces for highlighting the differences between "one county, two systems" and the freedom in Taiwan-ese people's democracy is that if polls are to be believed, the younger generation seems less concerned about losing some of the country's hard earned freedom while pursuing the objective of making money.
Polls taken before July 1, showed that the percentage of people opposed to the idea of "one county, two systems" had dropped from 87 percent to 70 percent. If such thinking were to lead to a willingness to try "one country, two systems" for Tai-wan, it would obviate the democratic system established in the last decade, and the rationale used by Beijing's leaders -- that democracy is not compatible with Asian values -- would be greatly strengthened.
Some people see the relatively benign reaction by Beijing to the demonstration that erupted in Hong Kong on July 1 as much more sophisticated and a great improvement over Tiananmen. No shooting. Only soft support for the leaders in Hong Kong and an equally soft insistence that Article 23 in some form and at some time in the future will have to be passed. Let time cool emotions and then the objective can move forward.
But greater sophistication shown by the leaders in Beijing will not shrink the fundamental differences between the systems on the two sides of the Strait.
Countries such as Japan, Botswana, India, the Philippines, of course Taiwan itself, and many others, all democracies and all certainly not seen as being "Wes-tern," belie that claim. With the deep negative impact on the people of Taiwan made by Bei-jing's behavior toward them during the SARS debacle, and the demonstrations in Hong Kong that have been so strongly felt in Taiwan, that attitude very likely has changed since those polls were taken.
So in considering Taiwan's interest in accepting or refusing "one county, two systems," the formal position taken by each side of the Strait makes the vast gap between them clear. Words used in describing these positions are often changed, but the gap in real terms remains. China wants "one county, two systems" for Taiwan. Its objectives have not changed; there is only one China, Taiwan is a province of China, not an independent sovereign state; Beijing prefers a peaceful resolution but reserves the right to use force; Beijing is the only legitimate power, and decides on issues of sovereignty, national security and foreign affairs.
By comparison Taiwan's position on unification is: Both sides must acknowledge the existence of two independent and sovereign entities; both sides must agree that the status of each entity is equal. No official negotiations unless China renounces the use of force. China must be democratized and have a free-market economic system.
The most dramatic example among the many differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan can be seen in the two government's attitude toward the people they govern during two incidents, in June 1989 and March 1990. Each was critical in shaping the direction China and Taiwan would take in their respective political systems.
Nine months after the bloody massacre in Tiananmen, students in Taipei gathered at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei to protest undemocratic decisions made by the government, and called for democratic change. I am told the now defunct Taiwan Garrison Command was insisting that it, armed, should break up the demonstration lest it set an unwanted precedent. Then president Lee refused the request. Instead, after he personally pro-mised the students he would open a conference that would be attended by all elements of society to discuss the future of Taiwan's democratization, the students went back to school. A quite different reaction to criticism by the people than that which occurred in Tiananmen.
There is more to this comparison, however. When the organization of the conference was published, there was widespread opposition by many conservatives among the elite of the then ruling party. The concern was that the result would drastically change the direction of democratization and allow the return of dissidents living abroad with quite different political views.
In fact, the conservative members were right, it did both. The results were debated well past the closing of the conference, as one would expect in a real democracy. But they were profound in nature and brought the change the students (and many others) had been demanding.
So one can compare: in Tiananmen, the demonstration ended in bloodshed with no change in the system. In Hong Kong the demonstration importantly showed a broader voice for the people, with no bloodshed, but also with no change in the system; in Taipei, there was no bloodshed, but there was very important change. A people's democracy moved forward. The result in Taiwan, too, was quite different from that in China.
The attitude abroad on "one county, two systems" as a possible resolution of the cross-strait issue is negative. It is based, however, too simply on the fact that Taiwan openly rejects it, meaning perhaps that it possibly can be negotiated. But there is more to it than that, which makes using "one county, two systems" even as a starting point impractical.
First is that their different political history and their different political systems are so incompatible that negotiations are not likely to get anywhere. Second, as long as the people of Taiwan have the power to choose and to understand the consequences, they are unlikely to choose any agreement that results in less sovereignty and less power than they now have.
One doesn't know how much of the coming elections will be run on the issue of national identity. It seems at this point to be inevitable. But in the past, com-mon issues of the moment and personalities often came to dominate attention. To the extent the national identity issue is used, voters, and those abroad with interests in Taiwan, should know well what it faces before it makes a choice.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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