In addition to the economic stimulus bills, a major controversy in the Legislative Yuan's extraordinary session was the proposed national referendum bill. Referendums are a demonstration of civic power, and the direct exercise and expression of that power can supplement the shortcomings of the legislature. In any given mature democracy, only the substantive contents of referendums can possibly become the focus of controversies.
The right of citizens to vote in referendums shouldn't incite disputes. While Taiwan has left behind the shadow of former authoritarian rule and implemented institutionalized democracy, it is still plagued by disputes over drafting a referendum law. On the surface, both the ruling and opposition camps seem to support the passage of the law, but it is not that simple. Both sides appear to have their own concerns, and no one dare to go all out in support of the law. This is a phenomenon worthy of pondering.
The referendum issue touches the sensitive unification-independence nerve of the opposition and ruling camps. The pan-green camp hopes to demonstrate the mainstream popular will of society through the holding of referendums, while the pan-blue camp fears that referendums will ultimately lead to a duel between unification and independence supporters.
The nativization camp, spearheaded by the DPP, has for years advocated the enactment of a referendum law, while the pan-blue camp limits the scope of its support to the constitutional right of "initiative and referendum." The two sides couldn't be further apart on the issue, creating distrust between them and making it virtually impossible for them to share any common ground.
Surprisingly, after President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) spoke out in support of holding referendums on World Health Organization participation and on halting construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, the blue camp changed its long-held position with respect to referendums, supporting the enactment of a referendum law, and even proposing enactment of the law this month and holding a referendum next month.
It went so far as to support the draft referendum law pitched by DPP Legislator Trong Chai (
The blue camp now adamantly supports the right of citizens to referendums, yet just when the referendum law seemed closer to materialization than ever, Chen chose to reiterate his promise not to declare independence, so long as China does not invade. Moreover, the version of the bill endorsed by the DPP makes referendums on national sovereignty a defensive measure, meaning such a plebiscite would only take place if and when China uses force against Taiwan.
This way, referendums become a means through which important public issues, rather than the future of the nation, are decided. In contrast, the blue camp made a drastic change of position, adopting the stance of "anything goes" when its comes to topics to be voted on by referendums.
Does this mean that the ruling and opposition camps have exchanged their political stance, with the ruling party stepping back on the issue while the opposition party marches forward? The answer is, of course, no. The change is only strategic, rather than a fundamental change of principals. The reason the blue camp dares to adopt the "anything goes" attitude, including the holding of a referendum on independence, is because it knew very well the DPP wouldn't move too aggressively under the threat of an attack from China.
The opposition alliance opted to deliberately beef up the substance of the bill, hoping to see a ruling party fiasco. While referendums may be an important policy plank of the DPP, it cannot afford to ignore the potential clashes that might be triggered in holding a referendum on the issue of independence, in view of the realities of the cross-strait relationship and the international community. Therefore, a highly conservative version of the referendum bill was born.
While the strategies of the ruling and opposition camps may be different, the concerns of both sides are nevertheless the same -- namely, "fearing the wrath of China." For the longest time, "tip-toeing around China" was one of the biggest roadblocks to progress in this country. All the controversies seen in trying to pass the referendum law are just one example.
For decades, aside from the period in which the nation vowed to "oppose communism" and "retake the motherland," all major policy changes, irrespective of whether they were political, economic, military, diplomatic or even educational and cultural, Taiwan was unable to help but set a red line. The first consideration in everything was always whether China would be provoked, and whether tension in the cross-strait relationship would be created. With extreme fear and caution, things moved along gradually and incrementally.
However, as pointed out by former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Nat Bellochi in a recent article in a Chinese-language newspaper, the popular election of the president, to the downsizing of the provincial government, to the amendment of the Constitution, all went through public and fierce debates in Taiwan. They all proved that the so-called "red" lines of alert did not exist. People were worrying for no good reason.
Judging from history, the so-called red line of alert may not exist, yet, members of the pro-unification camp have emphasized the need to cross the red lines set by China during the reform process, in an attempt to obstruct the nativization and democratization movements. History shows they were simply needlessly confining themselves.
The most glaring examples are probably the popular election of the president and the downsizing of the provincial government. Taken to the extreme, belief in a red line can lead people to perceive nativization education as a gradual independence movement seeking to sever cultural ties with China. Under the shadow of the so-called red line, Taiwan can barely move. Nor can it implement structural reforms.
Let's suppose China did set a red line, as demonstrated by verbal and military threats, including the missile launches in the Taiwan Strait when former president Lee Teng-hui (
Facts prove that had Taiwan been excessively worried about a red line and unable to struggle free from the groundless fear of "incurring the wrath of China."
Without crossing this line, democratic achievements such as the popular election of the president, the downsizing of the provincial government and the election of legislatures could never have been accomplished.
Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country already. If it wishes to change its name or national flag, then it would of course require approval through a referendum.
If both the opposition and ruling camps can truly follow the ideal of Taiwan first, and genuinely think of the welfare and interests of the people, then nothing can stop the people of Taiwan from seeking freedom, autonomy and happiness, with or without red lines.
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