On June 1, US President George Bush discussed Taiwan with Chinese President Hu Jintao (
On the other hand, China's People's Daily smugly noted on June 13, that after having deviated to the right from the policy of the previous six US administrations, Bush's Taiwan policy had now moved back to the middle. It twisted Bush's "non-support" to "opposition" to Taiwan independence and deliberately confused the US' "one China" policy with Beijing's "one China" principle, two phrases with distinctly different substance.
Regardless of the official platitudes, has US policy towards Taiwan changed? Here is what the US official said:
"On Taiwan, the president repeated our policy of a `one China' policy based on the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA], no support for Taiwan independence ... The president also said ... if necessary, we will help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself."
Bush's remarks are a weakening in US support for Taiwan.
First, this is the first time "no support for Taiwan's independence" has been elevated to the level of the TRA and the three communiques.
Second, Bush didn't mention peaceful resolution with the assent of the Taiwanese people.
Third, in April 2001, Bush promised that the US would do "whatever it took" to help defend Taiwan, committing the US to maximum effort in Taiwan's defense. The new wording, "If necessary, we will help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself" has two qualifications.
The phrase "if necessary" can simply mean "if China were to attack Taiwan." But then the phrase is superfluous because US intervention presupposes Chinese military aggression. There is little question that if the People's Liber-ation Army (PLA) were to launch a blitzkrieg against Taiwan, the nation could not alone repel the Chinese forces. Taiwan would clearly need US assistance.
China has always insisted on its right to use coercion. Beijing in fact has promised to take military action if Taiwan refused to surrender its sovereignty indefinitely. So why the qualifying phrase "if necessary?" An alternative interpretation is that Bush is hedging against Taipei's opting to unilaterally surrender its sovereignty. Similarly, the phrase "to the extent possible" could be a hedge against the eventuality of Taiwan's leadership caving in to PLA coercion so quickly that US intervention becomes impossible.
The above parsing of Bush's remarks may be too pessimistic but it is not groundless. Although not publicly acknowledged, Washington is steadily losing confidence in Taiwan's resolve to fight for its survival as a democratic and de facto independent nation. Under the Chen administration's policy of economic integration with China, the nation's economy is increasingly dependent on China. Due to massive outflow of capital, technology and manpower to China, the economy is being hollowed out. And yet, all political parties are intent on early implementation of direct links, further endangering Taiwan's political independence and security.
While China has expanded its military expenditure year after year and has been modernizing the PLA at a rapid pace, Taiwan has been steadily cutting its defense budget for the past decade.
In next year's presidential election the combined KMT-PFP ticket has a good chance to win. It is widely believed the KMT-PFP leaders would negotiate terms of unification with Beijing as soon as they took power. KMT Chairman Lien Chan (
The Chen administration, too, has done its share in undermining Washington's trust of Taiwan as a reliable ally. In his New Year's Eve 2000 message, Chen proclaimed that it is the policy of his administration to promote cultural and economic integration with China, leading eventually to political integration. Since then, Chen has been vaunting his "integration doctrine" to visiting US Congressional delegations. He has also sent high officials to the US and China to ex-pound on the doctrine.
There is serious concern in Washington about Taiwan's ultimate intentions. This undercurrent of mistrust is eroding the foundation of US-Taiwan partnerships in the cause of freedom. Last fall the US House of Representatives pas-sed Section 1202, the interoperability provision to enhance training and exchanges between the US and Taiwan militaries. The Senate failed to pass the provision.
When the House-Senate conference committee tried to fashion a compromise, both the White House and the State Department were opposed; the Pentagon was neutral. The final provision, which was enacted, was essentially without substance. On June 2, the American Enterprise Institute in Washington hosted a conference on the prospects for a US-Taiwan free-trade agreement (FTA) which featured many prominent panelists.
Majority Leader Tom DeLay was the keynote speaker. A US-Taiwan FTA would create a segment of American business with vested interests in Taiwan's survival as an independent country. The political significance of an FTA outweighs the economic benefits.
While DeLay and other members of Congress have urged an FTA with Taiwan, the Bush admin-istration has refused to place Taipei on the list of potential free-trade partners. Ostensibly the obstacle lies in the issues raised by the US Trade Representative's office such as intellectual piracy, import quotas on rice and non-tariff barriers against US companies. The basic problem lies in the growing anxiety regarding Taipei's commitment to a democratic future.
It is premature to say that Washington has despaired of pre-serving Taiwan's status quo. At his AEI speech, DeLay attacked the "one China" policy and affirmed US commitment to help defend Taiwan: "... the `one China' policy ... is the means to an end, not the end itself. America's primary objective in Asia ... is the preservation of democracy and the expansion of freedom," he said.
"Some have wanted to transform this diplomatic nuance into a recognition of Beijing's territorial claim over Taiwan: a recognition that has not and never will exist," he said.
"We must not allow a thriving democracy to be swallowed up by a communist dictatorship. As long as a free and democratic Taiwan, willing to defend itself, needs help securing its borders, we will be there," he said.
The Bush administration's robust support of Taiwan has been diluted primarily due to Tai-pei's failure to unequivocally com-mit the nation to a democratic path and secondarily due to America's need to elicit China's help in fighting global terror and in resolving the North Korean nuclear standoff.
This shift in the US stance is tactical, however, not strategic. The US still has geopolitical interests in maintaining the status quo. The recent appointment of Princeton professor and prominent Sinologist Aaron Friedberg to the post of deputy national security advisor and director of policy planning on Vice President Dick Cheney's staff tends to support this conclusion.
Friedberg is alert to the potential dangers a modernized PLA may pose to US homeland security and has written about the likelihood of a US-China confrontation.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, world politics has become highly volatile. US-Taiwan relations cannot escape the dynamics of changing international relations.
Opinion surveys show a great majority of the Taiwanese prefer the status quo and reject Chinese rule. The people must elect political leaders with the vision and courage to safeguard their life, liberty and property. This means disenfranchising politicians and businesspeople whose allegiance rests with China. If this can be achieved, Taiwan can secure firm and unflinching US support and with it a prosperous, free and democratic nation.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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