The statements by Chinese Vice Premier (and Health Minister) Wu Yi (吳儀), as well as her delegation, at the World Health Assembly (WHA) last month made a stir. The Taiwanese people's strong reactions to those remarks also revealed a sense of helplessness. Most of those who advocate confrontation with China have lambasted Beijing for its barbarian behavior, webs of lies and politicizing approach.
Those trumpeting deference to China showed slight disappointment at Beijing's hardline attitude. They believe that, amid the SARS outbreak, criticism and public sentiment triggered by China's move will be detrimental to future cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Here we encounter a problem of understanding. Has a "new thinking" appeared in China's Taiwan policy after the Chinese Communist Party's 16th National Congress put the "new three-stage one China theory" in its political report? Many academics and politicians believe China's internationalization and institutionalization of the new rhetoric mean a further softening of its policy on Taiwan. This in turn implies that the problem of negotiating cross-strait relations is back in the hands of Taiwan's government.
Some even believe that the rhetoric regarding three new phases places Taiwan and China on an equal level, which is unpre-cedented. They also said that former president Jiang Zemin's (
On the other hand, some academics expressed their qualms, saying that Beijing is not sincere in resolving these problems but has offered this small favor as a piece of "united front" propaganda to unite Taiwan's opposition parties and put pressure on the DPP's strategies. They also say that the "three issues open to discussion" actually narrow the field that can be negotiated and that the frame of "one country, two systems" remains unchanged.
The two interpretations underline Taiwan's two differing attitudes towards the China policy. The attitudes can be simplified as being confrontational and deferential.
Pro-confrontation activists spare no effort in finding fault with China's concessions before citing contradictory actions by Beijing to assert their argument that China's animosity has not decreased.
Pro-deference proponents look through China's documents to seek any tiny hint of goodwill in the wording. They then interpret all China's concessions as the beginning of more concessions to come, calling it a "new thinking."
Did Wu's statement prove that the new thinking has died an early death? Or, is there no new thinking at all? This event actually high-lights the poor understanding of China within Taiwan's political and academic circles. It also highlights the fact that the pro-confrontation and pro-deference factions have interpreted Beijing's moves according to their own sentiments.
In fact, whether a new thinking exists is not important at all. The significance lies in that Beijing set the tone for its Taiwan policy at the 16th National Congress, reiterating tits "one China" policy and "one country, two systems" framework. Then it revised the definition of the "one China" principle, drawing up but also restricting the new scope for negotiations.
What Beijing did also reflects its greater confidence in its right to interpret the "one China" principle to the international community. Taipei has lost the ability to -- ?and will not -- challenge Beijing's definition of "one China" with an interpretation of its own.
In fact, China's 1993 statement of "three-stage one China theory" and its repeated diplomatic suppression of Taipei deprived this country of its ability to interpret "one China" in 1993. Therefore, China's renewed "concession" merely places the fact before the eyes of Taipei, telling Taiwan the definition and framework of the "one China" problem are control-led by Beijing.
Taipei's position is very similar to that of the UK when it negotiated the Hong Kong issue in 1982 -- powerless. The ball is now in Beijing's court. Perhaps in view of its unstable domestic politics, Bei-jing did not put forth its "new thinking" at the WHA. This was also the result of rational judgement because, after all, if the "new thinking" was presented, Taipei's response would be unpredictable.
In addition, since the SARS outbreak was quickly spreading, Beijing had no time and capability to consult the opinions of its Taipei friends. If the move failed, it might even have triggered a leadership reshuffle. Naturally, Beijing opted for the suppression strategy, where the consequences are more predictable.
In reality, Beijing's suppression is not a problem for Taipei. Experience tells us that Beijing's oppression will instead contribute to stronger unity among the public. The real predicament for Taipei is that if Beijing really puts forward its "new thinking," the nation's political and academic circles will definitely split up between pro-confrontation and pro-deference stances, thereby leading to endless infighting. The problem will then become too complex to solve, turning into a thorny issue for the government.
Taiwan's lack of consensus on the issues of national identity and future development at present undoubtedly makes the democratic government unable to operate on the cross-strait issue. During this time, Beijing might have seen through the serious divergence of opinion in Taipei. After its new government stabilizes, it might focus on Taipei's scars to make its moves.
As a result, our government must not let down its guard during this crisis. It should actively guard against the "new thinking" that Beijing might toss out to hit our sensitive nerves.
Lee Tuo-tzu is a graduate student in the Graduate Institute of National Development at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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