PFP Chairman James Soong (
In 2000, the "will of heaven" literally decided Chen's victory. Next year it is the people who will decide the final outcome. Well, we can say that the upcoming election will no longer be a struggle against "the will of heaven" but against the will of the people.
A KMT-PFP coalition or a joint ticket is definitely a political hurdle. It was almost an impossible jump. To our surprise, it has become a reality. Perhaps a reunited KMT is making a final push for political supremacy. It is clear Lien and Soong and their subordinates do not talk about the distribution of power between the two parties or between the two chairmen. Rather, they stress "unity."
The problem of power distribution, however, will not simply go away even if they do not discuss it. Their current position is that they will discuss power distribution after winning the election. The two parties hope to cooperate, not merge.
Lien already asserted that "all troubles end when the main trouble ends," meaning the election outcome will bring an end to all the problems, including power distribution. Soong is also trying to leave room for maneuver, for himself and for the party.
Should the Lien-Soong ticket win the election, we'll see if the two sides will cooperate while fighting with each other. We will see which role will prevail, a president with real power or a vice president "prepared for succession." One way or the other, each side has its own calculations.
What is so dreadful about a KMT-PFP coalition is not the "Lien-Soong ticket" before the election but a possible "Lien-Soong clash" after winning the election. On that occasion, the "undiscussed" power contention will come to the fore. And the resulting "semi-presidential" system of a Lien-Soong victory will only increase the possibility of power competition between the president and vice president, or between the KMT and PFP.
Some people believe the two parties can merge if the office of the presidency and the resources are in their grasp.
Why do the two parties only cooperate but not merge before the election? The answer is not difficult to deduce: A merger is easier said than done. If the problems of power distribution can be difficult enough to shatter a KMT-PFP coalition before the election, why will the two parties be able to sit down and discuss the issues after the election?
When former president Lee Teng-hui (
The fact that the KMT and PFP refrain from discussing party politics and power competition suggests that they take Taiwan and the people for granted. No matter what happens, they think a coalition will ensure victory. They rely on the political structure in which the pan-blue camp is bigger than the pan-green camp.
It is true that Lien and Soong together won 60 percent of the vote in the 2000 election, as opposed to Chen's 40 percent. Plus, in various elections after 2001, it has been difficult for the pan-green camp to secure more than half of the vote. Among the one-on-one races, the pan-green camp only won by a narrow margin in Taipei County and Kaohsiung City.
Well, the question before us is whether the KMT-PFP coalition will definitely win the election. The reason why the pan-blue camp thinks a Lien-Soong ticket is promising is because they believe a KMT-PFP coalition is invincible. And they think the DPP will win only if there is a split within the pan-blue camp.
However, things have changed structurally in four years. For one thing, Chen as the incumbent president stands on a vantage point. Unlike Chen, Soong is in a disadvantageous position. In 2000, he would rather split from the KMT and refuse to be Lien's partner. He was so confident in 2000 that he would win the election. The end result was that 50 years of KMT power was ended. Soong decided to return to the KMT after three years, no longer having the charisma he used to have in 2000. And, the KMT's younger generation already has someone like Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
For Soong, a Lien-Soong ticket is the only choice. Honestly, Soong intends to first win the election and then pursue further development.
The pan-blue camp longs for a KMT-PFP coalition, which is also the key to next year's election. The Lien-Soong meeting is a prelude to a KMT-PFP coalition. It is not surprising to see the meeting, an icebreaker, becoming a media focus.
Under the exposure of the news media and the political arena, the public opinion polls conducted by the United Daily News and China Times show that a Lien-Soong ticket will most likely secure only 37 to 40 percent of the vote. This figure is lower than that received by Soong alone in 2000. Before the Chung Hsing Bills Finance scandal (
Other opinion polls also show that there is only a difference of 5 percentage points between support for the Lien-Soong ticket and that for Chen. And, keep in mind that the pan-green camp's election campaign has not set into motion. Chen has not designated his running mate yet. It is therefore clear that the pan-blue camp has no certainty of success. The pan-green camp will not necessarily lose the election.
What needs to be explored further is that people only see the advantage of a KMT-PFP coalition but not the negative side of the Lien-Soong ticket. In particular, Lien remains as unpopular as ever. It is Lien, not Soong, who is going to run for the presidency. Soong, who scolded the KMT for its ill-begotten party assets in 2000, now partakes of them. The KMT, which criticized Soong previously for taking money, must now shoulder the consequences of the Chung Hsing Bills Finance scandal.
A Lien-Soong ticket clearly puts Lien and Soong in an embarrassing situation to make matters difficult for all KMT members.
It is clear that die-hard support for the pan-blue camp will not exceed 50 percent. The "legitimacy" of a Lien-Soong ticket is also questionable. A KMT-PFP coalition also lacks democratic procedures and will likely create repulsion. Without a "presidential and vice presidential election and recall law" (總統副總統選舉罷免法) amendment to legitimize a joint ticket by the candidates of different parties to run for presidential elections, a Lien-Soong ticket put together at will is likely to elicit much criticism.
A Lien-Soong ticket could have had a decisive victory in 2000. The fact that Lien and Soong are now back to square one when Chen has moved forward is a historical irony.
Nevertheless, the Taiwanese people will make the final choice.
Chin Heng-wei is editor-in-chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.
Translated by Grace Shaw
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