PFP Chairman James Soong's (宋楚瑜) speech on the eve of his meeting with KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) confirmed his reluctant consent to a Lien-Soong ticket in the next presidential election. But, Soong sounded more like a martyr speaking before stepping into a proverbial lion's den. Not the slightest joy about this "match made in heaven" could be gleaned from his words. Despite the flowery words, the entire speech was riddled with accusatory undercurrents flowing toward the KMT.
"Between Lien and Soong, only one will run for the presidency," Soong said, and as for who will be that person, he indicated he will "respect Lien [on that point]." Since it is no secret that Lien will just about do anything to become president, it is very obvious what Soong really means.
Even though the KMT and Lien seem closer than ever to having things their way, they should still watch out. Despite Soong's repeated insistence that it does not matter "who takes the position [of presidential candidate]," and his statement that "there is nothing I could not give up," history tells us that Soong is just not the type to roll over and die. The louder Soong moans "persecution," the more reason his opponents have to feel worried. After all, victimization been proven time and again a most successful vote-sucking device for Soong. Remember how this poor martyr (then-provincial governor) after loosing power due to downsizing of the provincial government won sympathy to the tune of 4 million votes in the presidential election?
It's no wonder Soong went on to spend a good part of his speech prodding the KMT and Lien. First, he said that it would be difficult for the PFP to fully embrace the KMT until its "baggage" had been eliminated, subtly reminding the public about how KMT "black gold" might be a liability to the PFP.
Soong then declared his policies as provincial governor had done no harm to the KMT, therefore implying that his expulsion from the party was unjustified. The venomous subtext of this statement was that he is deserving of compensation. In other words, Soong is leaning heavily on his bargaining leverage, negotiating for the highest price possible for bringing his people in line behind a joint pan-blue ticket. This indicates that while a Lien-Soong ticket may be at hand, there is a long way to go when it comes to details.
Moreover, immediately after Soong gave his speech, the deputy convener of the PFP legislative caucus Chiu Yi (邱毅) said just because Soong expressed respect for Lien, it did not mean that a Lien-Soong ticket is a sure thing. Many PFP lawmakers were still pushing for Soong to run for the presidency after his talk. Surely, none of them will be too happy about the partnership until they learn what's in it for them. In view of this, the task of working out details quickly becomes a virtually insurmountable mountain of bickering.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the Lien-Soong partnership so far is the fact that a handful of individuals at the top of both parties decided upon the whole thing without any democratic process. While both the KMT and the PFP have indicated that they will hold meetings within their separate parties to finalize the matter, shouldn't those meetings already have taken place before Lien and Soong reached their agreement? Now these meetings will be nothing but rubber stamps with no democratic value and used simply to echo what's already been dictated.
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