KMT Chairman Lien Chan (
The KMT thinks there is no better time than now to confirm a Lien-Soong ticket. After all, the party's victory in the Taipei mayoral election has boosted internal morale to levels not seen in years, while Soong's "kneeling act" during the campaign was widely criticized. The PFP's image has also been tarnished by some of its members' alleged involvement in the Kaohsiung City Council vote-buying scandal.
As part of this push to promote Lien as presidential material and force Soong to settle for second billing, the KMT has launched a campaign to resurrect the legacy of the late president Chiang Ching-kuo (
Lien has said he is optimistic about reaching an agreement over a joint ticket with Soong. To demonstrate his sincerity, he has ruled out the possibility running on a ticket with Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
But surely all of Lien's optimism and magnanimity must strike the PFP as completely phony. After all, in the last presidential election, not only did Lien lead a party that had dominated the country for more than 50 years straight into opposition, he trailed far behind Soong both in actual votes and in popular support.
Some recent opinion polls have indicated that either a Lien-Soong ticket or a Lien-Ma ticket would draw more support than Chen's re-election campaign. But the key word there is either Soong or Ma, not Lien. So the best path for the PFP is to postpone locking in the ticket until the last possible moment.
In addition, the PFP cannot help but feel nervous about the long-standing desire within the KMT to see the two parties merged. It has already rejected one merger offer made by Lien. After all, the KMT may talk about cooperation and mergers, but its party charter contains a clause designed to keep Soong from ever becoming a member again. Sincerity is not something that either party knows much about.
Then there is the niggling little detail that a joint ticket has not been approved by a democratic mechanism of either party. Neither the officials nor the members of either party have been given the chance to debate the idea. Closed-door discussions between the parties' top leaders have little to do with democratic politics. Soong may claim that KMT-PFP cooperation would not mean a return to the old days of autocratic rule. But given the blatant disregard both he and Lien apparently have for the popular will, their teaming up may herald such a comeback.
Political cooperation must be based on common values and ideals and a shared vision for the future, something a KMT-PFP link-up clearly lacks. Such a marriage of convenience is unlikely to last and should not be encouraged.
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