Yesterday's mayoral elections in Taipei and Kaohsiung saw the incumbents -- Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) -- succeed in their re-election bids, thereby maintaining the current balance of power between the pan-blue and pan-green camps.
During the campaign period, many people defined the elections as a "test of confidence" in the DPP government, or a preliminary battle for the "second transition of political power."Many expected that the President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration would flunk, but yesterday's results were rather balanced.
The pan-blue camp's Ma saw significant gains in Taipei, beating the pan-green camp's Lee Ying-yuan (
Over-interpretation of the results are uncalled for. After all, these are local elections that have nothing to do with central government operations. The elections can therefore not be viewed as a "midterm" election for the central government, much less a second transition of political power. The ruling DPP lost the Taipei race but won in Kaohsiung.
The DPP's candidate, Lee, joined the race rather hastily and won far fewer votes than Chen did in 1998, but this should be attributed to personal factors. It is improper to view the results as a sign that the public mistrusts the DPP.
The elections will be followed by a reshuffle in the balance of power within the two camps.
The pan-green camp cooperated very well in the campaign, with the TSU's spiritual leader -- former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) -- stumping for the DPP's Lee Ying-yuan and Hsieh many times.
This cooperation will be extended to the 2004 presidential election. Ma's victory has made him the pan-blue camp's top celebrity in the election, but Ma would probably not try to rob KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) of his presidential candidacy in light of their teacher-student relationship.
Besides, the electorate may find it hard to accept a statement from Ma declaring his intent to run for president soon after he has won the Taipei mayorship. Ma is therefore unlikely to run for president. Instead, he will campaign for Lien and help him tackle Chen and PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜).
The PFP did not play much of a supportive role in the mayoral elections, but the party nominated large numbers of candidates for the city council elections in an attempt to crowd the KMT and New Party out of the pan-blue support base. The PFP's behavior has created misgivings within the other two parties.
On the other hand, the PFP is unhappy about Ma's refusal to stump for the PFP's city council candidates. In the final stage of the election campaign, Soong set a new precedent unheard of in the democratic world -- he knelt down on stage and begged the crowd to vote for the KMT's mayoral candidates.
But Ma was already way ahead of his DPP rival and Soong's kneeling act did not increase Ma's chances very much. Instead, it stirred suspicions that Soong was in fact trying to curb Ma's performance from soaring too high -- thereby threatening Soong's presidential ambitions -- or that he was trying to claim some credit for use in the future.
The election is now over. This newspaper congratulates the winners -- despite the political muckraking between candidates, which we hope will be rectified in future elections. The winners should remember their election promises and the responsibilities entrusted to them by the electorate -- and work to improve the lives of the people.
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