I served as a mentor and judge for last weekend’s inaugural Taiwan Defense Tech Hackathon, which was cohosted by the European Defense Tech Hub, National Taiwan University’s Unmanned Vehicles Research and Development Center, and the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, providing feedback to students, researchers, entrepreneurs and engineers who developed concepts for dual-use technology solutions to certain challenges and problems.
The value of this experience was being in the same room as the people who ordinarily sit outside Taiwan’s national security establishment, and observing them produce unconventional solutions using commercially available off-the-shelf technologies with civilian and military applications in a crisis.
Several teams proposed concepts focused on Taiwan’s coastal security gaps to help the National Police Agency (NPA), coast guard and navy address problems ranging from protecting undersea cables to alerting users to suspicious coastal activity. Before deployment, prospective end users would need to test and evaluate these concepts in realistic conditions.
To ensure that Taiwan continues to build its defense innovation and dual-use technology ecosystems while strengthening whole-of-society defense resilience, hackathons should become a regular part of the ecosystem. Taiwan’s existing competitions, research programs and accelerators could expand scenario-based experimentation to develop dual-use technologies that help sustain communications, logistics and other essential services during disasters or conflict.
Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience can draw on an immense reservoir of technical expertise and ingenuity. Ukraine’s experience shows how civilian skills and networks can support national defense. Regular defense technology hackathons around Taiwan could help build those connections before a crisis, provided they lead to sustained collaboration and usable capabilities.
Hackathons could complement existing competitions, including the upcoming National Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology’s AEGIS CTF International Invitational Tournament & National Defense AI Competition and the Presidential Cup Drone Competitions, which are scheduled later this year.
Such events can expose more of the nation’s technology sectors to security problems through rapid team formation, intensive prototyping and interaction with end users. Taiwan’s civilian technology sector offers a reservoir of expertise that could bolster whole-of-society defense resilience through closer connections with end users, as Ukraine’s experience illustrates.
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, civilian expertise was rapidly turned toward national defense, with programmers, engineers, drone enthusiasts and volunteers from various fields contributing to its whole-of-society effort to resist Russian armed coercion.
Some of Ukraine’s civilian technical networks were established before the full-scale invasion, including Aerorozvidka, a non-governmental organization founded in 2014 that pioneered drone warfare. By February 2022, Aerorozvidka had modified commercial drones, built a team of experienced operators and contributed to the military’s response. Hackathons can help technically capable people engage with civil defense and national security problems before a crisis hits.
During this year’s Han Kuang live-fire exercise, the Ministry of National Defense’s Cyber Command mobilized more than 100 civilian cybersecurity specialists to test and assess the defenses of energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure. Similarly, the ministry’s All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) mobilized civilians to help military units set up barriers and provide civilian transport capacity to move ammunition and other supplies.
Hackathons themselves would not deter “gray zone” activities, coercive behavior, compellent actions or a full-scale invasion by China. However, a robust ecosystem of these events and similar competitions could help build resilience and deterrence, and shape an adversary’s judgement of Taiwan’s ability not only to absorb a attack, but also to improvise, repair and mobilize civilian expertise. If these connections produce credible, tested capabilities that can function under an attack, they could undermine Beijing’s expectations of rapid success.
Policymakers, industry and other stakeholders should work toward creating a repeatable pathway for similar events so the hackathon’s impetus does not end on Sunday last week. Taiwan needs a pathway that lets more problem solvers address operational problems, build prototypes, test with end users, secure funding and ultimately field capabilities for civilian and, if needed, military end users.
Hackathon organizers should publish six-month results documenting continued collaboration with end users, realistic prototype testing, follow-on funding and any adoption. Holding such events alongside military exercises could connect civilian technologists with end users to explore problems exposed by unscripted scenarios.
Taiwan already has a starting point in this integration through the ministry’s Defense Innovation Office. The office offers prototype calls, research cooperation and small-quantity procurement for evaluation. A solicitation in February last year included intelligent warehouse management. Promising teams need operational sponsors and follow-up resources to navigate these mechanisms; funding and military adoption would depend on further evaluation.
It is key to do this all around Taiwan, not just in Taipei, given the unique insights that might come from Taichung’s advanced manufacturing sector, Kaohsiung’s maritime focus or rural areas, such as Taitung. Entities such as ADMA, the Industrial Technology Research Institute, the NPA and others could host hackathons.
Bryce C. Barros is a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Defense & Security Research. He previously served as a US Senate national security adviser from 2023 to 2024. The views expressed do not reflect those of the US government or other affiliations.
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