The opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan passed an opposition-backed bill that sets aside NT$240 billion (US$7.6 billion) for uncrewed systems over the next six years. At first glance, that looks like a major commitment to Taiwan’s defense and industrial development. However, the headline number does not guarantee the stability that industry needs.
Opposition legislators chose to fund the program through the regular annual budget process. Although the NT$240 billion is earmarked for uncrewed systems, the funding must still return to the Legislative Yuan for approval each year. Unlike a multi-year special budget, it remains subject to annual budget discussions, legislative delays and political disputes. Taiwan saw that risk this year, when the annual budget was not passed until this month.
Industry needs greater certainty. When manufacturers decide whether to build production lines, hire engineers, expand testing capacity or develop domestic supply chains, they need more than a six-year target written into law. They need predictable orders and a credible multi-year procurement pipeline. Annual uncertainty undermines the long-term investment Taiwan needs for rapid industrial expansion.
However, the opposition-backed bill creates an even bigger problem: bureaucratic duplication. The law requires the Executive Yuan to establish a “National Uncrewed Vehicle Industry Development Strategy Special Committee,” which would coordinate, promote and supervise uncrewed-systems policy and review the national industry development plan.
The Executive Yuan already has a coordination mechanism. Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君) already leads the “Interagency Task Force on Unmanned Vehicle Industry Development and Management.” Officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Ministry of National Defense (MND), Ministry of Transportation, National Science and Technology Council and other agencies use it to coordinate industrial development, defense autonomy, supply chains and regulation.
Individual ministries have clear responsibilities. The MOEA has a dedicated drone-industry development office. The MND has professional planning departments responsible for strategic planning, capability assessment and major defense acquisition.
The Legislative Yuan has the institutions necessary to provide rigorous oversight. Legislators on the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee oversee defense procurement, force development, drones and uncrewed maritime systems. Legislators on the Economics Committee scrutinize industrial policy. The legislature can question ministers, demand special reports, review budgets, amend laws and examine procurement programs. That is the proper place for oversight.
The opposition-backed legislation instead requires more than half of the new strategy committee’s members to be experts or academics recommended by party caucuses in the Legislative Yuan. This allows caucus-nominated members to participate directly in an Executive Yuan policy coordination and review mechanism. Legislators should not blur those roles.
Legislators should demand transparency, challenge procurement priorities and hold officials accountable when programs fail. However, party caucuses should not need to place their nominees inside an executive policy-making mechanism to exercise oversight.
Clear responsibility produces stronger accountability — and faster execution.
That matters especially for uncrewed systems, where technology evolves far faster than traditional defense procurement cycles. Requirements can change in months, not years. Taiwan needs a process that shortens the path from battlefield requirements to procurement and production. Every additional layer of review creates another source for delays.
The issue is not whether Taiwan should invest more or exercise stronger oversight. It should do both. The question is whether the institutions we create help Taiwan move faster. We should not create new institutions only to make functioning administrative and legislative oversight mechanisms more complicated.
The executive mechanism should be made to work, while the Legislative Yuan should review its results from the legislature. Taiwan does not lack committees. What it cannot afford to waste is time.
Gahon Chiang is a congressional staff member in the office of Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Chen Kuan-ting focusing on Taiwan’s national security policy. He is a research fellow at the Taiwan Inspiration Association.
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