Following the expiration of the US’ global 10 percent tariff measure under Section 122 of the Trade Act, Washington announced new tariffs ranging from 10 to 12.5 percent on imports from 60 economies, citing Section 301 of the act.
Taiwan and the EU are subject to a 10 percent tariff that is not stacked on top of most-favored-nation rates — better than those for Japan and South Korea.
More importantly, US tariff policy has evolved from a short-term trade negotiation tool into a long-term economic strategy that incorporates industrial positioning, investment guidance and geopolitical considerations. This reflects the US’ efforts to redefine the rules governing global economic and trade competition.
From an economic perspective, while Taiwan’s 10 percent tariff rate would increase export costs, it still maintains a competitive advantage over countries subject to the 12.5 percent rate. The real impact lies not in the tariff rate itself, but in the continued restructuring of global supply chains.
Moving forward, businesses would place greater emphasis on geopolitical considerations, tariff costs and supply chain resilience. For Taiwan, an economy highly dependent on exports, enhancing the added value and technological advantages of its products are more important than securing a lower tariff rate.
From an international perspective, US President Donald Trump’s administration has repeatedly adjusted its tariff policy over the past year, demonstrating that the function of tariffs has evolved from a means of simply raising import costs into a source of bargaining power. Trump used the tariffs to encourage countries to increase investment in the US, expand purchases of its products and cooperate with Washington on issues such as supply chain restructuring, industrial policy and geopolitics.
In other words, tariffs are no longer just part of trade policy, but an important tool for the US to promote its national strategy. This also means that the global trade order is gradually shifting away from a rules-based multilateral system toward a model in which major powers reshape the distribution of interests through bilateral negotiations.
For Taiwan, in addition to deepening cooperation with the US, it should also maintain the autonomy and diversification of its economic and trade strategy to mitigate risks brought about by changes in external policies.
From an investment perspective, what markets fear most is often not tariffs, but uncertainty. While the US’ tariff policy increases costs for other countries, its clearer and more predictable policy direction should help businesses restructure their global strategies. In the future, when companies evaluate where to invest, they would no longer compare only costs and market size, but also factor in tariff regimes, supply chain security and geopolitical risks.
The global economic and trade order has entered a new chapter. Countries would compete not only in terms of export capabilities, but also in the resilience of their institutions, technological strength and strategic positioning. What Taiwan ultimately needs to adapt to is not merely a new tariff regime, but an era in which the global economic and trading system has shifted from one based on free trade to one defined by strategic competition.
Dino Wei is an engineer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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