In July 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) made a historic visit to Tibet, becoming the first president of the People’s Republic of China to do so since Jiang Zemin (江澤民) in 1999. During the unannounced trip, which came against the backdrop of the China-India border clashes, Xi traveled to Nyingchi, near the Indian border, and to Lhasa, where he emphasized the need to strengthen Tibetan loyalty to China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Xi was accompanied by a high-profile delegation, including Politburo Standing Committee member Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), his close aide and frequent companion; former Chinese vice premier Liu He (劉鶴), his key economic planner; Yang Xiaodu (楊曉渡), a party discipline official with long experience in Tibet; Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰), China’s top development and infrastructure authority; and Zhang Youxia (張又俠), a senior military commander whose presence highlighted the visit’s security and military undertones.
Four years later, Xi last week returned to Tibet, this time for the 60th anniversary of the so-called “liberation of Tibet.” Such frequent visits by China’s top leader are rare, but this second trip must be understood in the context of crucial political and geopolitical developments.
Most notably, in July, just before his birthday, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama declared that there would indeed be a 15th Dalai Lama, adding that the authority to decide on the reincarnation rests solely with the Dalai Lama’s institution and Tibetans, not the Chinese state. He further proclaimed that the next Dalai Lama would be born in a free country outside Tibet, directly rejecting Beijing’s claim to control the succession process.
The announcement drew widespread international support, including from leaders in the US and India. Symbolically, soon after his birthday, the Dalai Lama traveled to Ladakh, where he was received with deep reverence by local communities. Ladakh, bordering Chinese-controlled Tibet and the site of the deadly 2020 border clash that killed 20 Indian soldiers, underscores the ongoing geopolitical stakes.
Adding to Beijing’s unease, Czech President Petr Pavel became the first Western head of state to meet the Dalai Lama in Ladakh, reinforcing global support for the Tibetan spiritual leader.
Against this backdrop, Xi’s visit to Lhasa last week was not an act of celebration, but a calculated projection of power. Four elements made this clear:
First was the choreographed public reception. Xi was welcomed at the airport by thousands of Tibetans in traditional attire, cheering him with singing and dancing, in scenes critics said had “North Korea vibes,” carefully staged to demonstrate mass loyalty.
Second, the visit featured an overwhelming military presence and a display of parades, underscoring the centrality of security and control in Beijing’s Tibet policy.
Third, Xi’s address repeated familiar themes of unity, stability and loyalty, emphasizing ethnic integration, loyalty toward the CCP, the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism, border security and anti-separatism, all aligned with Beijing’s assimilationist agenda.
Fourth, ideological and political reinforcement. Xi was accompanied by senior CCP leaders Wang Huning (王滬寧) and Cai Qi (蔡奇). Wang, the party’s chief ideologue, is the architect of assimilationist narratives, prioritizing Mandarin over Tibetan, replacing “Tibet” with “Xizang,” advocating the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism and reframing Tibetan history under CCP terms. Cai, a close Xi ally and Politburo Standing Committee member, oversees party discipline and security. His presence pointed directly to the tightening of religious and security controls.
Wang gave a speech during the trip, which further emphasized border security, ethnic integration, Sinicization of religion, Mandarin promotion and party-led unity.
Xi’s two visits to Tibet within just four years reveal their true intent. Far from being moments of celebration, they are calculated displays of Beijing’s power, rooted as much in confidence as in desperation to secure its grip over a sensitive and resistant region.
The visits highlight China’s determination to assimilate Tibet and its refusal to yield on matters of cultural or political autonomy. Xi’s repeated trips to Tibet, with speeches centered on issues of border security and control over Tibetan Buddhism, signal that Tibet’s role in broader geopolitics is only set to grow with particularly serious implications for India.
Dolma Tsering is a postdoctoral researcher in National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University’s Department of Humanities and Social Sciences.
What began on Feb. 28 as a military campaign against Iran quickly became the largest energy-supply disruption in modern times. Unlike the oil crises of the 1970s, which stemmed from producer-led embargoes, US President Donald Trump is the first leader in modern history to trigger a cascading global energy crisis through direct military action. In the process, Trump has also laid bare Taiwan’s strategic and economic fragilities, offering Beijing a real-time tutorial in how to exploit them. Repairing the damage to Persian Gulf oil and gas infrastructure could take years, suggesting that elevated energy prices are likely to persist. But the most
Taiwan should reject two flawed answers to the Eswatini controversy: that diplomatic allies no longer matter, or that they must be preserved at any cost. The sustainable answer is to maintain formal diplomatic relations while redesigning development relationships around transparency, local ownership and democratic accountability. President William Lai’s (賴清德) canceled trip to Eswatini has elicited two predictable reactions in Taiwan. One camp has argued that the episode proves Taiwan must double down on support for every remaining diplomatic ally, because Beijing is tightening the screws, and formal recognition is too scarce to risk. The other says the opposite: If maintaining
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), during an interview for the podcast Lanshuan Time (蘭萱時間) released on Monday, said that a US professor had said that she deserved to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize following her meeting earlier this month with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Cheng’s “journey of peace” has garnered attention from overseas and from within Taiwan. The latest My Formosa poll, conducted last week after the Cheng-Xi meeting, shows that Cheng’s approval rating is 31.5 percent, up 7.6 percentage points compared with the month before. The same poll showed that 44.5 percent of respondents
India’s semiconductor strategy is undergoing a quiet, but significant, recalibration. With the rollout of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0, New Delhi is signaling a shift away from ambition-driven leaps toward a more grounded, capability-led approach rooted in industrial realities and institutional learning. Rather than attempting to enter the most advanced nodes immediately, India has chosen to prioritize mature technologies in the 28-nanometer to 65-nanometer range. That would not be a retreat, but a strategic alignment with domestic capabilities, market demand and global supply chain gaps. The shift carries the imprimatur of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, indicating that the recalibration is