Thu, Feb 13, 2025 page8

• Hungary-China ties hurting the EU

  • By Michele Maresca
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  Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s foreign policy strategy is grounded on the principle of “autonomy from the two blocs,” which makes it a unique case as far as EU states are concerned.

  A case that illustrates this policy is Orban’s unwillingness to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin into a “long and just peace” with Ukraine stemming from the understanding of the other’s independence and autonomy from Moscow.

  In that sense, since the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022, Hungary has been a pain in the neck for the vast majority of EU countries that are keen on approving ever-more effective and meaningful sanctions on Russia.

  Orban is openly declaring his nation’s opposition to a new EU package of sanctions on Moscow if “Brussels doesn’t persuade Ukraine to reopen a pipeline that delivers Russian gas to some central European countries, like Hungary.”

  Another clear example of the Hungary-EU gap on foreign policy issues is the China file. In this regard, there are many cases that illustrate this scenario:

  First, Orban is one of the few heads of states who stand in opposition to the EU plan to impose higher tariffs on the import of Chinese electric vehicles (EV).

  To justify his position, Orban stressed that “what the European Union is doing is an ‘economic cold war.’” His statement points out that “this will lead to the EU’s death.”

  Budapest’s closer relationship with Beijing is further illustrated by the latter’s decision to open the first Chinese EV production factories in Hungary in 2023. While most EU countries have moved toward “derisking” and “decoupling” from China, Hungary is a lone wolf in its strategic relations with Beijing without taking into account the consequences stemming from an unequal relationship.

  In defiance of the likely outcomes of increasing dependence on China, the Hungarian government questions the general idea that Beijing poses an acute risk to supply chain resiliency, national security and technological competitiveness.

  When he talks about an “EU willing to force Hungary into the bloc where they are, where I think there is no growth, no development, no future,” Orban wants to challenge the existence of the EU as a beacon of democracy, and a model of prosperity and stability to promote in opposition to the Russia and China bloc.

  This is exemplified by Hungary’s posture in regards to China’s claims to Taiwan, as stated in the third point of the parties’ joint statement on the establishment last year of an All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the New Era.

  The third point outlines that the “Hungarian government remains firm in adhering to the one China principle” and “reaffirms that the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing China.”

  The Hungarian government’s posture is reinforced by Budapest’s opposition to “all forms of separatist activities at breaking the unity of China,” signaling a clear break from the “one China” policy accepted by the EU and its member states.

  Hence, Hungary should be regarded as a key partner to China in a wide number of topics, ranging from the economy to diplomacy and security.

  The two countries last year signed a deal that could see Chinese police patrolling the streets of Hungary within the framework of a “cooperation in law enforcement and joint patrols.”

  Beijing deemed it as a way of “building up a new type of international relations,” hence it is clear that “Orban’s interests” collide with the EU’s.

  As Hungary moves closer to China, it becomes increasingly evident that their “all-weather strategic partnership” poses a significant risk to the “security infrastructure” of the EU as a whole.

  As China aims to divide Europe through strategic bilateral relationships with EU states, above all Hungary, the EU should keep pursuing a “derisk” and “decouple” agenda, showing its willingness to deal with Beijing solely on a collective basis.

  Given the challenges it is facing, the EU must act decisively to curb Chinese interference activities aimed at destabilizing its democratic and liberal environment.

  Even if Hungary does not want to play on the same field, a comprehensive and just policy toward China is still possible.

  Michele Maresca is an analyst at Il Caffe Geopolitico, an online international law journal, and the Geopol 21 think tank.
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