Former Japanese minister of defense Shigeru Ishiba has been elected as president of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and would be approved as prime minister in parliament today.
Ishiba is a familiar face for Taiwanese, as he has visited the nation several times. His popularity among Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) lawmakers has grown as a result of his multiple meetings and encounters with legislators and prominent figures in the government.
The DPP and the LDP have close ties and have long maintained warm relations.
Ishiba in August 2020 praised Taiwan’s success in curbing the COVID-19 pandemic and said that other countries should learn from its experience.
With the election of Ishiba, it is sensible to anticipate closer diplomatic ties between the two East Asian countries.
Ishiba in July 2022 met then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and called for more discussions on policy to enhance bilateral security ties.
He also said that the stability of the region can only be safeguarded by formulating concrete countermeasures against coercive behavior.
Ishiba is expected to back practical measures to strengthen ties with Taiwan, especially on nontraditional security issues.
Given his track record of offering suggestions to assist Taiwan in addressing environmental challenges, this likelihood is quite probable.
However, what could regional security look like during Ishiba’s premiership?
Ishiba attaches great importance to national defense and advocates for strong deterrence regarding great-power rivalry. When he led a delegation to Taiwan in August, Ishiba exchanged views on regional security issues with President William Lai (賴清德) and underlined the importance of upholding security in East Asia while seeking to avoid conflicts.
“Preventing today’s Ukraine from becoming tomorrow’s East Asia” is of the utmost priority, Ishiba said.
“The democratic camp must jointly exert a deterrent force to maintain regional peace and stability,” he added, highlighting the importance of collective efforts to shore up deterrence to prevent crises.
As a defense policy expert, Ishiba is well-positioned to translate his expertise to the implementation of concrete policies to bolster Japan’s security position, particularly amid its ongoing tensions with an assertive China and the nuclear-armed North Korea.
Ishiba’s proposal for an Asian NATO to counter security threats from Beijing and Pyongyang is a contentious one, given that countries in the region are far from united on how to deal with China.
For such an Asian alliance to succeed, Japan must successfully mend relations with South Korea, a country with testy ties with Tokyo.
However, US officials maintain that an “Asian NATO” is “not what we’re looking for.”
Although controversial and possibly unrealistic, Ishiba’s idea of a collective security grouping of like-minded countries in the region to collaboratively confront common concerns and prevent a regional hegemon from becoming “too powerful to contain” is intriguing.
Such a grouping could eventually evolve into minilateral security pacts to beef up deterrence that could make China, Russia and North Korea think twice before launching any confrontational actions toward Taiwan and Japan.
US backing would be essential for such minilateral arrangements to take shape. However, Ishiba’s call for Japan to have an “equal” alliance with the US might prevent such security initiatives from materializing.
As of right now, Ishiba’s suggestions are political rhetoric. However, if former US president Donald Trump wins the presidency next month, US-Japan relations would be sure to be uncertain, given that both leaders would consider the alliance unfair, albeit for their respective reasons.
In weathering the China storm, the incoming prime minister might cautiously develop ties with Taipei while pursuing stable relations with Beijing, particularly through enhancing dialogues and resolving differences through increased communications.
In general, Ishiba advocates deeper engagement with Beijing rather than vilifying it, but the possibility of him pursuing a more middle-of-the-road approach might prove challenging given China’s increasingly assertive behavior and a growing feeling among Japanese that China is a threat.
Regarding defense ties between Taiwan and Japan, a significant breakthrough is unlikely — the Japanese government would be unlikely to provide military support to the nation in the event of a Chinese attack.
For Japan to engage militarily, Ishiba would have to convince the National Diet — Japan’s parliament — that the situation poses an imminent danger to the nation’s survival, and the national legislature body would be unlikely to support Japan’s involvement, given the potential for a Chinese retaliation.
Ishiba might also be reluctant to seek to enhance military ties with Taiwan due to his wanting to focus on domestic factors to boost his party’s support, such as implementing economic and political reforms.
Therefore, a balanced foreign policy approach between Taiwan and China is likely to take precedence.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulated Ishiba’s on his election victory, which was well-timed. Now, it would be wise for Taiwan’s national security team to reach out to Ishiba’s advisory group and chart out potential collaborative paths.
Both sides should join hands to enhance science and technology resilience. The semiconductor industry is a cornerstone of Taiwan-Japan relations and accounted for 40 percent of their US$75.7 billion bilateral trade.
Ishiba campaigned on a promise to increase semiconductor and artificial intelligence investment. In keeping with former Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida’s policies, which encouraged semiconductor investments from Taiwan, Ishiba has plenty of incentives to encourage deeper semiconductor cooperation with Taipei.
Japan’s chip-related workforce has decreased by about 20 percent over the past two decades, and top domestic chip companies would need to recruit about 40,000 workers in the next decade to maintain the industry’s edge, the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association said.
Taiwan could be of assistance here.
National Development Council (NDC) Minister Paul Liu (劉鏡清) on Sept. 17 said the two countries should work together to support talent cultivation and enhance funding for technology projects. Such an offer would likely be one that Ishiba’s government would be interested in.
With Ishiba’s election as prime minister, Japan and Taiwan would likely forge stronger ties, but it is unclear how far the two partners would boost relations in the face of a powerful China.
To enhance deterrence and safeguard regional peace in the face of increasing belligerence in the region and globally by China, Russia and North Korea, it is imperative that Taiwan and Japan begin laying the necessary groundwork to deepen their collaboration on economic and nontraditional security matters.
Huynh Tam Sang is a lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City-University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Young Leaders Program member of the Pacific Forum, and visiting scholar at National Taiwan University. Truong Tuan Kiet is a research assistant at Ho Chi Minh City-University of Social Sciences and Humanities and a columnist at the Vietnam Strategic Forum.
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