War, possibly global, will define the coming decade — so it is crucial that Taiwanese decide now what their freedom and their lives are worth — perhaps starting with a defense budget of 5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The force that threatens Taiwan, the Communist Party of China (CCP) and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA), asserts that a free, or even worse, an “independent” Taiwan is the greatest threat to the CCP’s dictatorship.
Accordingly, they are prepared to kill Taiwanese by the millions, which also will initiate their longer war against democracies.
Should it succeed, Chinese sources are all but openly stating that a CCP/PLA occupation of Taiwan will be an exercise in bi-partisan horror and brutality; it will massacre Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) leaders, activists and members without hesitation.
On August 8, 2024 the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) effectively proxy state media the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on a leaked report of the Cross-Strait Institute of Urban Planning at Xiamen University, which proposed the creation of a “Taiwan Central Work Committee” that would act as a “shadow government” for a newly-conquered Taiwan.
According to the SCMP this committee should “be ready to assume control of the island’s administration at any moment,” an ominous warning of a potential attack and of the CCP’s willingness to wage a bloody lightning campaign to achieve such control.
The Xiamen University report notes, “The recent unrest in Hong Kong shows that the one country, two systems approach of fully accepting the existing system is not necessarily suitable for Taiwan… Taiwan should aim to fully integrate into the mainland from the beginning.”
One of the SCMP’s missions is to peddle psychological warfare, fear and deception, but it does offer partial truth in noting that the Xiamen University study “offers a rare glimpse of the discussions going on in mainland China over the future of self-ruled Taiwan.”
It is more likely that the CCP’s concept for a Taiwan Central Work Committee has been evolving for decades in strict secrecy, made more important by Hong Kong’s stunning rejection of the CCP’s previous unification doctrine of “One Country, Two Systems,” leading to an ongoing harsh CCP crackdown.
Xiamen University’s report has also exposed as another cynical CCP lie, its 2022 White Paper on Taiwan promising “autonomy” for the democratic island, now destined to suffer CCP rule “from the beginning” of its conquest.
But even before the first PLA invader shoots the first Taiwan citizen, the CCP is spooling up its “reign of terror” for the people of Taiwan, which could quickly transition to the harassment of citizens from any country that support the right of a free Taiwan to exist.
On June 21 state media Xinhua announced new guidelines punishing supporters of “Taiwan independence,” issued by “the Supreme People’s Court [of China], the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministries of public security, state security, and justice” which now enable Chinese authorities to impose a “death penalty and a trial in absentia in relevant cases.”
Xinhua says that “those who are found to have colluded with any foreign or overseas institution, organization or individual in committing such crimes, should be given a harsher punishment,” meaning that foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals supporting Taiwan’s freedom could also, ultimately, suffer death penalties.
On August 7, China state media Global Times reported that China’s Taiwan Affairs Council, which conducts the CCP’s relations with Taiwan, and the Ministry of Public Security (police) issued a short list of Taiwan independence “diehards,” focusing on the current DPP leadership of Taiwan, and a snitch email address for “netizens to report secessionists.”
After the June 21 announcement both KMT and DPP leaders were quick to denounce China’s guidelines, with many noting China has no legal jurisdiction in Taiwan.
But this will not stop the CCP from initially trying DPP leaders in absentia, and attempting to kidnap them should they travel overseas.
As the CCP is not bound by any legal limits, it is fully capable of expanding its definition of “Taiwan independence supporter” to any KMT member or foreigner who supports Taiwan’s democracy.
The CCP’s insidious strategy is to force political division in Taiwan, first by isolating the “criminal” DPP with broadening death threats, and then to use similar threats to dissuade leaders, academics, and regular citizens of other democracies from supporting a free Taiwan.
Though the CCP’s base strategy of death threats should unite Taiwanese in defense of their country, and result in greater willingness by the democracies to openly support Taiwan’s defense, the CCP is choosing a good year to peddle intimidation and fear.
Taiwan’s main supporter, the United States, is mired in a divisive election cycle, and whether the victor is former President Donald Trump or current Vice President Kamala Harris, after inauguration in January it will take a year or more to choose key personnel, get them confirmed by Congress, determine new policies, and secure the budgets to implement them.
A divided US Congress could further delay the process.
And while the US enters a period of “structural” political weakness, China is now leading a coalition of dictatorships that include Russia, North Korea and Iran, all nuclear armed (Iran is soon to be), that singly or jointly could force multiple major military crises which could divert already strained US military resources from a timely, adequate response to a Taiwan Strait crisis.
The PLA’s increased ability to more rapidly mobilize for a Taiwan War was demonstrated by the May 23-24 “Joint Sword” 2024A joint-force exercises around Taiwan, which began with scant warning and saw the PLA deploy over 100 combat aircraft and 19 PLA Navy and Coast Guard ships.
For its invasion, PLA Navy amphibious craft plus scores of large ferries could transport 100,000 troops to Taiwan, with 3,000 Airbus and Boeing airliners pumping in tens of thousands more, or the PLA could mass over 10,000 fishing ships to vastly complicate Taiwan’s defenses.
The CCP’s threat of invasion, growing PLA pressures, and questions in Taipei regarding the assurance of American military support, are enduring themes of the US-Taiwan relationship.
Preferences from Washington, started during the Obama Administration, that Taiwan develop stronger “asymmetric” military capabilities focused on direct defense against invasion — instead of longer range capabilities to force the PLA to stay farther away from Taiwan — became questionable as growing PLA strength undermined US assurances of their utility against more distant PLA threats.
In a June 25, 2024 interview with Bloomberg, presidential candidate Donald Trump created new anxiety when he said, “I think Taiwan should pay us for defense.”
Then on July 16 in an interview with Bloomberg at the Republican National Convention, Trump’s last National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, offered an explanation, saying, “They’ve [the Taiwanese] got to ramp up their spending to contend with the PRC and CCP, and we can help them, we can be part of that. But I think what President Trump is saying is ... we’ve got to have burden sharing.”
O’Brien then suggested that Taiwan basically double its defense spending to 5 percent of GDP.
For Taiwan this would be a major sum, over 40 percent of government spending.
But at this time when the CCP’s invasion threats are becoming immediate, and it is revealing its “reign of terror” for the people of Taiwan, is 5 percent enough?
A major increase in military spending that approached the 5 percent of GDP level would garner attention not just in Washington, but also in Beijing and Tokyo.
As US production of major weapons systems has already been stressed by requirements to arm Ukraine to defeat the nearly 2.5 year Russian invasion, a massive increase in Taiwanese military spending would offer options to greatly improve Taiwan’s indigenous military development and production capacities.
Instead of buying US missiles, buy US factories for 1,000 kilometer range PrSM ballistic missiles that will soon have anti-ship attack seekers.
Or instead of buying more F-16 fighter jets, fund the purchase of engines and local components for Taiwan’s second generation, much improved Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF).
Taiwan has just launched the Hui-long, its 100 ton unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that is also unpowered, to test technologies for Taiwan’s planned fleet of eight 2,500 ton Hai Kun conventional attack submarines.
With a far greater defense budget Taiwan could build a fleet of 25 powered Hui-long UUVs, perhaps armed with four torpedo tubes, which could break a PLA Navy blockade of Taiwan, or undertake a severe economic strike against China by mining Shanghai waterways, cutting it off from global commerce.
Or a much larger budget could begin to purchase the assault rifles, sniper rifles and anti-tank rockets to arm a 2-million person Citizen Reserve Force, a necessary antidote to PLA invasion waves of 100,000 or more.
A larger defense budget would also give Taipei options to increase Philippine defense capabilities, such as greatly increasing its Coast Guard to fight back against China’s maritime coercion, or should all fail, to help rescue Taiwanese seeking to escape a CCP invasion.
In addition, as the United States does not have any tactical nuclear artillery shells — a very low yield, short range defensive weapon that could assure deterrence of a PLA invasion of Taiwan, or a North Korean invasion of South Korea, by assuring the destruction of naval and land invasion forces — why not offer to fund a revival of their US production?
As China’s growing military strength is giving the CCP confidence to increase its military and political terror against the Taiwanese and their supporters, a rapid military buildup by Taiwan can yield military-political benefits for Taipei.
Sharply increased Taiwanese military strength and a willingness to use that strength to leverage new levels of military readiness and cooperation, likely would ensure that Washington, Tokyo, and Manila would be more willing to increase joint training and even direct military cooperation.
Deterring a CCP war and saving millions of Taiwanese lives is well worth a 5 percent of GDP defense budget.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
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