With the presidential and legislative elections just around the corner, the US aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson has been traveling southward to the South China Sea. It is clear that the US aims to prevent China from intervening in Saturday’s elections, to ensure that the next president is elected without incident.
In the western Pacific Ocean, the US has the USS Ronald Reagan and its carrier strike group deployed near Japan’s Yokosuka. If the situation were to intensify, another carrier strike group could be dispatched immediately for assistance.
The Carl Vinson participated in joint military exercises involving several countries, including Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore and the UK.
On Dec. 17 last year, the carrier arrived in Singapore for a visit, before leaving on Dec. 25 for the South China Sea. The carrier strike group consisted of the Carl Vinson and its aircraft unit Carrier Air Wing 2, the USS Princeton, the USS Kidd and the USS Sterett.
When the Carl Vinson carrier strike group appeared in the South China Sea, the US said its purpose was to uphold freedom of navigation, as well as maintain peace and order in the international community.
However, as the US deployed two carrier strike groups close to Japan and in the South China Sea, it appears that the Carl Vinson carrier strike group’s purpose is to prevent any attempts to interfere with Taiwan’s elections.
Several reasons are behind this move.
First, the US wants to deter China from interfering with Taiwan’s elections. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military threats always become more frequent and overt when Taiwan is about to hold elections.
The US’ deployment of the carrier strike groups intends to counter the CCP’s provocative activities, ensuring that the elections are carried out smoothly without foreign intervention.
Second, the US is showing off its military might, and aircraft carriers are the best way to do that. In the past few years, the CCP has been threatening Taiwan with its military activities.
Along with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force, Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force, Chinese carrier strike groups have been sent across the first island chain to the east of Taiwan. The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning used to play a significant role. From last year, the Shandong began to take up this role.
However, given that the USS carrier carries twice as many aircraft as the Liaoning, Taiwan and the US would be capable of handling a potential situation even if the Liaoning and the Shandong encroached on Taiwan.
Third, the US wants to show that the CCP aircraft carriers are not powerful enough to handle counterattacks. The Liaoning and Shandong were designed in line with the Soviet Union’s defensive carriers, whose major purpose was to defend against attacks from the sky. To contend with other warships, the Soviet ship were equipped with anti-ship missiles.
However, to increase their aircraft capacity, the CCP’s carriers are not equipped with such missiles. The Liaoning and Shandong use ski-jump takeoff systems, which means that aircraft cannot be fully loaded when launched, and hence their combat power is more limited.
The PLA carrier strike groups serve as convoy escort forces for the Renhai-class cruiser, which is equipped with YJ-18 anti-ship missiles and YJ-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles. Obviously, the CCP wants to make up for its lower counterattacking capabilities by enhancing the combat power of its Shenyang J-15 fighters.
Fourth, the US is bolstering ties with allies. Before the Carl Vinson visited Singapore, it participated in joint military exercises with several allies, all working together to deter an attack.
In a war scenario, the US and Japan would seek to protect the Miyako Strait and the area surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), also known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, while the US and Taiwan would look after the Bashi Channel and Balintang Channel. That way, the CCP’s carrier strike groups would not be able to break the first island chain, and Taiwan would not be threatened and its defensive power would be enhanced.
“A Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-US alliance,” former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe once said. As Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections near, the Carl Vinson and its carrier strike group might head north to keep the South China Sea stable while defending the Taiwan Strait.
Ou Si-fu is a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research.
Translated by Emma Liu
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