Indonesian President Joko Widodo is expanding his family dynasty, son by son. The announcement that his eldest child Gibran Rakabuming Raka has been picked as Indonesian Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto’s running mate in next year’s presidential election is just the latest in a series of political maneuvers that have cemented his image as a Javanese kingmaker. It will also allow him to pull the strings behind the scenes long after he relinquishes power.
Gibran has not confirmed whether he will accept the nomination yet, but Prabowo registered his candidacy on Wednesday. This is deeply disappointing for the nation’s nascent democracy, the world’s third largest, and many Indonesians had hoped it would not happen.
To understand what a huge departure this is from the man he used to be, it is worth reflecting on how much Jokowi, as he is known, has changed during the course of his presidency. I first met him more than a decade ago, when he was governor of Jakarta. At the time, chatting to him in a leafy green park in his white crisp linen shirt and sandals, I was struck by his sincerity and disruptor mentality. As an outsider, he could see the obvious issues that needed to be fixed within the political establishment and there appeared to be a genuine desire on his part to change things.
However, that optimism and enthusiasm were pushed aside for the practicalities of doing politics in Indonesia. This included the weakening of the anti-corruption agency, and a drift toward authoritarian politics. Millions of people elected him as the leader of the world’s most populous Muslim nation in 2014, believing he would be different from the cast of characters in the Suharto-era. Jokowi’s victory was rightly heralded as a milestone, a coming of age for the country’s democracy — a sign that if a furniture maker from Solo could beat the odds, as one voter told me at the time, any outsider could do the same.
How things have changed. If you want to do well in politics in Indonesia, it certainly helps to be related to Jokowi. Take a look at the family tree. Not only is 36-year-old Gibran campaigning for the vice presidential spot, in 2020 he was elected mayor of his home city of Solo. The young politician won by a landslide in large part thanks to Jokowi’s popularity and social capital. Then there is younger son, 28-year-old Kaesang Pangarep, better known for his YouTuber appeal than his political experience, who last month became chief of the Indonesia Solidarity Party (PSI), catering to younger voters. And finally, son-in-law Bobby Nasution, voted in as mayor of Medan in 2020. His campaign drew heavily on family connections, building a perception that he would get special attention from the central government because of his privileged position.
Jokowi has batted away any suggestion that his family benefits because he is the head of state. If Indonesians want to vote them in, he told me in this interview in 2020, I can not stop them. It is the public’s decision.
However, even the charismatic leader, with his consistently solid approval ratings, will not be immune to the public’s displeasure with what appears to be dynastic politics re-emerging in the archipelago.
“A vote for Gibran as vice president will ensure that Jokowi will be able to continue having behind-the-scenes influence during the Prabowo administration,” Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore senior fellow Alexander Arifianto told me. “Political dynasties in Indonesia are not unusual, but not particularly effective. They also invite public backlash once declared openly.”
That backlash is already beginning. Last week’s ruling by the constitutional court to lower the minimum age for presidential and vice presidential candidates with legislative or regional leadership experience, was widely viewed as a way to clear legal obstacles for Jokowi’s son’s vice presidential bid. The response has been largely negative, partly due to the fact that presiding over the proceedings was Chief Justice Anwar Usman — the Indonesian leader’s brother-in-law.
The transformation of Jokowi the man of the people, to Jokowi the pragmatic politician and now potential dynasty-builder has been slow and gradual. Like many other Asian leaders, his priority has been economic development and infrastructure reform rather than a focus on fixing democratic institutions, often at the expense of weakening them. If his economic ambitions collided with anti-corruption agendas, he prioritized the former, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute visiting fellow Burhanuddin Muhtadi said.
Zeroing in on development is straight out of dictator and former president Suharto’s playbook. A fellow Javanese, he ruled Indonesia for more than three decades and died in 2008. He left behind six children who, at one point, were among the wealthiest people in the country, with extensive business interests granted by their father when he was in power. Now it is Suharto’s former son-in-law, Prabowo, who is tying up with Jokowi’s son to lead the country next year. None of this will be lost on Indonesians. They have seen this movie before and will be wondering whether keeping it all in the family is what is best for their future.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Taiwan aims to elevate its strategic position in supply chains by becoming an artificial intelligence (AI) hub for Nvidia Corp, providing everything from advanced chips and components to servers, in an attempt to edge out its closest rival in the region, South Korea. Taiwan’s importance in the AI ecosystem was clearly reflected in three major announcements Nvidia made during this year’s Computex trade show in Taipei. First, the US company’s number of partners in Taiwan would surge to 122 this year, from 34 last year, according to a slide shown during CEO Jensen Huang’s (黃仁勳) keynote speech on Monday last week.
When China passed its “Anti-Secession” Law in 2005, much of the democratic world saw it as yet another sign of Beijing’s authoritarianism, its contempt for international law and its aggressive posture toward Taiwan. Rightly so — on the surface. However, this move, often dismissed as a uniquely Chinese form of legal intimidation, echoes a legal and historical precedent rooted not in authoritarian tradition, but in US constitutional history. The Chinese “Anti-Secession” Law, a domestic statute threatening the use of force should Taiwan formally declare independence, is widely interpreted as an emblem of the Chinese Communist Party’s disregard for international norms. Critics
Birth, aging, illness and death are inevitable parts of the human experience. Yet, living well does not necessarily mean dying well. For those who have a chronic illness or cancer, or are bedridden due to significant injuries or disabilities, the remainder of life can be a torment for themselves and a hardship for their caregivers. Even if they wish to end their life with dignity, they are not allowed to do so. Bih Liu-ing (畢柳鶯), former superintendent of Chung Shan Medical University Hospital, introduced the practice of Voluntary Stopping of Eating and Drinking as an alternative to assisted dying, which remains
President William Lai (賴清德) has rightly identified the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a hostile force; and yet, Taiwan’s response to domestic figures amplifying CCP propaganda remains largely insufficient. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) recently confirmed that more than 20 Taiwanese entertainers, including high-profile figures such as Ouyang Nana (歐陽娜娜), are under investigation for reposting comments and images supporting People’s Liberation Army (PLA) drills and parroting Beijing’s unification messaging. If found in contravention of the law, they may be fined between NT$100,000 and NT$500,000. That is not a deterrent. It is a symbolic tax on betrayal — perhaps even a way for