China uses a two-handed strategy of “war and peace” to tackle not only the Taiwan issue, but also major international affairs for diplomatic gains.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, China has repeatedly declared its diplomatic neutrality, while emphasizing that a sovereign state’s territory cannot be invaded, and yet it never criticized Russia for invading its neighbor.
China not only abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution that condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also bought a massive amount of Russian oil at the highest price globally while the West was imposing comprehensive sanctions on Moscow.
The unusual oil purchase was indirect financial support for the Russian invasion, and an encouragement for Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue the war.
On Feb. 24, the first anniversary of the war, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a “12-point statement” reiterating China’s position on the Ukraine crisis, calling on the two countries to agree to a ceasefire and resume peace talks. Some US and European media outlets learned that while proposing peace talks, Beijing was simultaneously discussing with Moscow the acquisition of 100 attack drones and ammunition.
On Feb. 26, CIA Director Williams Burns said during an interview with US broadcaster CBS that Washington is “confident” China is considering providing lethal equipment to Russia.
There were already signs that China was providing military assistance to Russia last year.
Media reports, citing German intelligence sources, said that China had used government-controlled import-export firms to transfer civilian drones to Russia through the United Arab Emirates for military reconnaissance missions in Ukraine.
Last month, the German weekly Der Spiegel reported that the Russian military was negotiating with Chinese drone manufacturer Xian Bingo Intelligent Aviation Technology to purchase 100 ZT-180 “suicide drones,” and that the company had agreed to deliver the devices by next month.
China and Russia have long built close military relations because of their common strategic and tactical interests in international affairs, as demonstrated by the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) to Russia in March 2013, when the Russian government invited him to the Ministry of Defense in particular.
Ten years later, Russia and China have developed a comprehensive strategic partnership of military coordination. Therefore, as the Chinese government sees that Russia has not yet gained an advantage in the war, and that its military has been badly damaged, it is not difficult to foresee Beijing eventually providing Moscow with lethal weapons.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has repeatedly said that China is considering offering weapons and ammunition to Russia. White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has said China’s military aid to Russia would be a huge mistake and would come at “real costs.”
China failed to act like a great power when the war broke out, as it refused to join the US and European countries in condemning Russia’s bloody aggression and demanding that Russian troops withdraw from Ukrainian territory. Over the past year, Beijing has increased its imports of Russian oil, despite international opposition, and its intention to support Moscow is evident.
However, it has suddenly proposed peace talks as the war enters its second year.
The diplomatic motive behind this is not so simple, as it is again trying to adopt a two-handed strategy.
Yao Chung-yuan is a professor and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s strategic planning department.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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