On Sept. 10, 1992, a meeting took place in Hong Kong between representatives of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, which gave birth to the so-called “1992 consensus.”
To coincide with the 30th anniversary of the meeting this month, the official publication of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) — the CPPCC Daily — ran an article titled “Root and branch reform: Distortion of the ‘1992 consensus’ cannot be tolerated.”
The article said that “the ‘1992 consensus’ means only ‘one China’ — there is no scope for a different interpretation [of what China means].”
Like a parent scolding a naughty child, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece went on to criticize the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) for its “distortion” and “misrepresentation” of the “1992 consensus.”
KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) responded: “If they state their position and we state our position, is that not each side providing its own interpretation [of what ‘China’ means]?”
The article shows that the CCP is using a key state-run publication to set the tone for the future of cross-strait policy.
The CPPCC is a “united front” organization and its chairman, Wang Yang (汪洋), is also a member of the CCP’s seven-strong Politburo Standing Committee. The CPPCC Daily is an intermediary used by the CCP to publicize the party’s “united front” stance and policies. The article is therefore by no means an off-the-cuff editorial piece: It should be taken as representing a shift in direction of the party’s stance toward the “1992 consensus.”
The article poses a significant crisis for the KMT, which has for decades tied its cross-strait policy to the “1992 consensus” and its appended formula: “‘One China,’ with each side having its own interpretation of what ‘China’ means.”
With Beijing using an official publication to unilaterally change the meaning of the “1992 consensus” — and publicly criticizing the KMT’s embellishment of the “consensus” as a “distortion” that “muddies the waters” — Chu’s response was impotent and ineffectual. If each side is saying its own thing, can there be any form of consensus between the CCP and the KMT?
The article also surreptitiously merges disparate strands of information to fabricate historical statements — a classic “united front” tactic.
The article references the UN Security Council’s 1971 Resolution 2758, which it said “resolved all of the problems, including Taiwan, relating to representative authority at the UN.”
The article also misrepresents the World Health Assembly’s 1972 Resolution 25.1, which it said “determined that Taiwan was a province of China and therefore did not have an independent status, and that Taiwanese officials did not enjoy any form of political status.”
Both of these statements are false. Neither resolution refers to “Taiwan” by name.
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China, Taiwan and Mongolia Rick Waters has previously criticized China for misusing Resolution 2758 in an attempt to manipulate public opinion and trick the international community into erroneously believing that China possesses sovereignty rights over Taiwan.
The article shows that the CCP intends to define the “1992 consensus” as nothing more than another version of its “one China” principle that provides no room for the coexistence of the Republic of China. Whether the KMT continues to doggedly cling to its “1992 consensus” remains to be seen.
Liou Je-wei is a graduate student of political science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Edward Jones
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