Prior to yesterday’s chairperson by-election, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) Central Committee instructed its Organizational Development Committee to determine how many party members have paid their dues.
The committee found that, as of Sunday last week, there were 333,065 eligible members, with significant increases in Changhua County and the party’s Huang Fu-hsing (黃復興) military veterans’ branch.
In Hualien County, there were more than 4,800 new paying members.
An investigation found that the membership dues for more than 1,000 people had unknowingly been paid by someone who must have registered their national ID numbers online, downloaded and printed the payment slip, and paid the fee, thus making them nominal party members.
With the consent of chair candidates — KMT Legislator Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) and former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) — the party canceled those members’ voting rights, but it did not investigate who had made the payments.
It is almost certain that only people inside the party would have access to its list of members in a special branch or a certain administrative area.
It is also not possible that someone could do this without help; there must have been someone directing it from behind the scenes.
An interesting question is where all the money for the fees came from. The origin could be found by following the money, but the perpetrator would likely push forward a trusted subordinate to take the rap.
Another case of nominal party members in Hualien County occurred in 2017.
The Chinese-language business monthly CommonWealth Magazine reported on Jan. 8 that when the KMT’s Hualien County branch organized elections for branch director, membership increased by 6,000 to 7,000.
In the end, Hualien County Medical Association director Chou Yung-hung (鄒永宏) — an affiliate of former Hualien County commissioner Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁), who was expelled from the party in 2009 — was elected.
Newspapers have reported that the Huang Fu-hsing branch is the strongest supporter of reinstating Fu’s party membership.
The branch used to be very pro-military, but now bears a striking resemblance to a group of swindlers or a pyramid scheme.
What does KMT Legislator Wu Sz-huai (吳斯懷), a retired lieutenant general, and former premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村), a former chief of the general staff and Hau Lung-bin’s father, think of the branch now, or does it remains the pride of the retired military officers still receiving a monthly pension?
Creating nominal party members also serves other purposes, such as scheming to benefit personal interests. They can also be used behind the scenes to direct the election of central committee or central standing committee members obedient to one person or group, making the party apparatus their own tool.
If the KMT is really determined to regain public support, it should use legal means to reveal who is behind the nominal party member scheme and bring them to justice, showing its determination to eradicate old habits and establish new ideals.
The party must track down the origin of the funds used to pay the membership fees. If it does not, the KMT would likely fail to transform itself into a democratic party and become a breeding ground for greed.
If that is the case, and the party disappears, it will only have itself to blame.
Chang Hsun-ching is a writer.
Translated by Chang Ho-ming
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