Taipei Times: You recently returned from heading the Taiwan delegation to the US National Prayer Breakfast. Could you share with us the discussions that took place during your visit there?
Wu Li-pei (吳澧培): We spent seven days in the US, including visits to New York, Boston and Washington. During our stay, we met and exchanged views with a number of think tanks, members of congress, former and incumbent officials, as well as media outlets.
The main issues put forward by us were the EU's plan to lift their embargo on arms sales to China, China's proposed "anti-secession" law and Taiwan's bid to take part in international bodies; whereas for the US, they often brought up topics ranging from [Taiwan's] referendum to constitutional reforms and Taiwan's arms procurement from the US.
PHOTO: GEORGE TSORNG, TAIPEI TIMES
On the arms embargo, we expressed our deep concern over the possibility that should the EU decide to lift the embargo on arms sales to China, it would destabilize the East Asian security environment. We mentioned that it could also further weaken the US' presence in the Asian region, which is already on the decline.
The only thing remaining would be to decide how to approach [the issue] so as to effectively prevent this from happening.
As the US works to improve its relations with the main EU members such as Germany and France, it makes us feel a bit more optimistic that the US may be able to efficaciously prevent [the EU from lifting their embargo.]
On China's planned "anti-secession" law, we let them know that Taiwan, after the bitterly fought elections of last year, was able to -- after the elections -- address issues in a more rational and calm manner.
As a result, Taiwan can better express goodwill toward China, which seemingly responded by sending two of its [Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait] officials to participate in the funeral for [late Straits Exchange Foundation chairman] Koo Chen-fu (
China's plan to enact its "anti-secession" law, however, quickly destroyed all this amity.
Although its content is not yet known, the fact that they have introduced this law is itself already a very malicious move. We relayed to the US in strong terms that this proposed law of China's is absolutely unacceptable to Taiwan.
Besides, we don't think the law would bring any good to China since it would end up scaring Taiwanese businessmen away from investing there.
The issue that concerned them the most was arms sales. We of course explained to them that it is domestic politics. You can't blame the president when it is the Legislative Yuan that failed to pass it [the bill for the weapons procurement budget].
Their biggest concern, even from those who generally are friendly with Taiwan, was that, "are you just going to sit there and let us do the job?"
Unfortunately, from what we observed, it was apparent that this was the general impression lingering in US political circles -- that they think Taiwan doesn't want to defend itself, and simply expects the US to come and act as its shield.
TT: What were your observations with regard to the US' view on China's proposed "anti-secession" law?
Wu: I once said that it is strenuous work [for Taiwan] to be an ally of the US, as any tiny moves will be fingered by the US as acts of provocation and Taiwan will be branded as being a "trouble-maker."
But the fact is that when you look back on all that Taiwan did, none of it was offensive. Actions that the Americans consider provocative were in fact merely self-defense. The reason for self-defense is simply Taiwan's wish not to be swallowed [by China], either by military force or any other kind of threats.
With the introduction of its "anti-secession" law, China is now clearly ruffling the cross-strait status quo, yet why is the US still talking about "quiet diplomacy"?
Some of the people we met said they feel they can exert more influence on Beijing through "quiet diplomacy." [In response, my question for the US is], are you telling me then that when it comes to dealing with Taiwan though, quiet diplomacy is not an option, and instead all you need to do is issue a public reproach and we will be quiet?
Aside from quiet diplomacy, I think other approaches should also be taken by the US.
I believe that the House of Representatives will, in the immediate future, make some moves in this regard, through which I hope -- with efforts by Taiwan-friendly congressmen -- a resolution of some kind can be introduced and passed.
My perception from meeting with the Americans is that they are concerned about it but are not quite optimistic on the possibility of having China ditch the proposed law.
The US has so far declined substantive comment on the law, stating that it cannot do so without seeing the text first. The US' general attitude presently is that "we will wait and see."
TT: Some say China's proposed "anti-secession" law is, to a certain extent, a move to challenge the US' "Taiwan Relations Act." Was this brought up during your exchanges with the people in the US?
Wu: We mentioned this observation to them. I asked them: If cross-strait tensions were indeed escalated as a result of China's "anti-secession" law, then whose fault is it?
Are [the Americans] going to blame Taiwan for it again?
During conversations I mentioned that Taiwan may embrace some kind of legislative move to counter this law of China's.
Some responded that Taiwan ought not to take a similar move to [China's proposed law.] But I told them that many legislators in Taiwan, which is a democratic country where various views are freely expressed, are already extremely irked by this proposed law of China's and have claimed they will push for some kind of law as a countermeasure.
I then asked them what President Chen Shui-bian (
Besides, regardless of what the text of the law may be, the symbolism of enacting the law would itself stir cross-strait tensions.
Some even suggested that Taiwan cease pursuing constitutional reform in exchange for China dumping the proposed law.
In response, we told them that, first of all, we are not in a position nor do we possess the authority to speak about such an issue, and secondly, President Chen has long stressed that constitutional reform will not touch upon issues concerning changing the country's official title, national anthem and the like that would touch on cross-strait sensitivities.
By the same definition they asked us not to be too concerned about China's planned "anti-secession" law before seeing its text. I asked them in return why, then, is the US opposed to Taiwan undertaking constitutional reform before [it] has a full understanding of what our Constitution is like? Do they know how absurd our Constitution is?
TT: Beijing is expected to take up its proposed "anti-secession" law at the National Peoples' Congress this month. As countermeasures, some in Taiwan proposed to enact an "anti-annexation law" or a "China relations act." Others suggested the need for government to proceed with a referendum. What's your opinion on this?
Wu: I think these counteractions are unavoidable if China does indeed proceed with enacting the law. If Taiwan sits idly by without uttering any strong and loud reaction, it would mean Taiwan is accepting it.
As to how to react and the extent of the response, this would depend on the content of the law -- whether it has been watered down to a mere superficial insignificance or is something that immediately threatens our breathing space.
But either way -- regardless of its content -- the very fact the law exists, should it be enacted, undoubtedly has already raised cross-strait tensions.
TT: A joint security statement recently released by the US and Japan declared peace in the Taiwan Strait as one of their "common strategic objectives" which, as far as one can remember, is the first time Washington and Tokyo have publicly described the Taiwan issue as a joint strategic priority. What's your view on that?
Wu: Through our exchanges during the visit, we could sense the US is concerned that its power in the Asian region will be replaced by China.
The US at present is preoccupied with affairs in the Middle East and North Korea, and thus it needs assistance from Japan in attending to other issues. Given that Japan also faces a military threat from China, the US and Japan both ... have something to offer each other. The US hopes Japan could help shoulder part of its load, while Japan can count on support from the US.
I think the US-Japan declaration, to a certain extent, was aimed at China's expanding influence in the region which, they feel, may threaten their power. China's proposed "anti-secession" law played a part in it as well since the law, should it pass, would inflame cross-strait tensions -- something that both the US and Japan are reluctant to see.
From the perspective of international politics, securing their own interest is, of course, their main concern. If one is to observe calmly, there is no doubt the US is honestly concerned that China will be the one having the greatest effect on its long-term interests.
In addition, Japan's sense of self-respect is slowly taking form after more than 60 years of being suppressed. I think the US welcomes the emergence of this trend among the Japanese people. So the Japanese government will, along this course, naturally take on more responsibility and become closer to the US.
I think all this is a plus to Taiwan's survival.
TT: What's your view on the resolution that was recently introduced in the US House of Representatives calling for the Bush administration to scrap its "one China" policy and resume formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan?
Wu: I was thrilled to see this event. I have funded an organization in the US called the Formosa Foundation. To the best of my knowledge, it is the only NGO in the US that calls for ... the US' "one China" policy to be changed to a "one China, one Taiwan" policy.
I am glad to see there are voices echoing this call and that some members in the US are slowly having serious second-thoughts on the US' "one China" policy.
In light of the call, I think our strategy should now focus on how to further strengthen promotion of it among the US people, to propel them to demand the US Congress and the US government recognize that the basic problem in resolving the Taiwan-China issues lies in the need to recognize Taiwan. Once it recognizes Taiwan, all issues regarding whether Taiwan can join global organizations such as the WHO would be gone and the US' policy concerning Taiwan would become clear and forthright.
It is true when we say we are not a normal country. The deformity is not that we are not a normal country, but the lack of recognition from members of the international community.
TT: Speaking of which, it seems more people in the US are familiar with the plight of Tibet than that of Taiwan. What are your thoughts on that?
Wu: It is true that we have not done enough work in the area of gaining understanding and sympathy from people in the US with regard to Taiwan's predicament.
We ,of course, have been lobbying US politicians, but the political lives of politicians are short, and when their terms are up they are done.
I admit Tibet's situation is somewhat different from that of Taiwan. It is poorer and its people are being oppressed severely, so it is easier to gain sympathy from the Americans, whereas with Taiwan, people think that we are well-off and do not need sympathy.
We need to tell people Taiwan's story. We should deepen our appeals to the US people. If we could have Friends of Taiwan or the like in all the states in the US, then via these groups we could work to deepen the people's understanding about Taiwan's situation and its plight. These organizations could also allow retired US politicians who are Taiwan-friendly to continue to have an influence by, for example, being the presidents of them. When Taiwan is confronted with issues, these Friends of Taiwan headed by influential main-stream figures in the US could then act as a voice for us to the US congress and the US president.
I think an operation of this sort is necessary.
TT: Based on your understanding and observation, how would you comment on the US' Taiwan policy under its new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice?
Wu: I think, in the short run, there won't be many major changes in its policy. But I think there would be changes in terms of gestures.
For instance, in recent remarks made by Rice when she was touring Europe, she said the US hopes peace can be maintained across the Taiwan Strait, that both sides of the Strait will not provoke each other, and also noted that it hopes China will not provoke [Taiwan] and that Taiwan will maintain self-control.
Rhetoric of this manner is different from that of the past. Since Rice is close to President Bush, I think there will be consistency there now that she has assumed the post [of secretary of state].
Her personal ideology is closer to that of President Bush, in that they share abhorrence of communism. President Bush also stated in his second-term inauguration speech that he aims to promote democracy to other parts of the world.
Sept. 11 changed everything. Instead of keeping a tab on China, the US' attention and resources were diverted to the Middle East. We therefore need to comprehend the international reality and know how to play our role accordingly.
I think that in the short run, the US will not support us in anything they think will change the status quo. But in the meanwhile, it is also attaching importance to deterring China from expanding its power.
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