In military manpower and hardware, the PRC enjoys a quantitative superiority that Taiwan has no hope of matching or even closing the gap.
The PRC's 2.5 million strong armed forces far outnumber Tawain's 400,000. The PRC figure does not include the one million People's Armed Police.
The PRC has over 4,000 aircraft, whereas Taiwan has some 400 "second-generation" advanced fighter aircraft.
Illustration: Mountain People
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has about 65 attack submarines, five of which are nuclear powered, whereas Taiwan has only four diesel submarines, of which two are of the WW II vintage. The PLAN has over 60 major surface combatants while Taiwan has about 40. China has nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile force (Erpao) that can launch nuclear or conventional warheads against Taiwan.
Diminishing returns
In terms of the quality of military manpower and hardware, Taiwan still possesses a diminishing edge.
The ROC is about to complete equipping its navy and air force with new and advanced fighter aircraft (Mirage 2000, F16 and IDF) and naval frigates (Lafayette, Knox, and Perry class). Other advanced equipment such as E2C (early warning aircraft),ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and many other weapon systems have either already been deployed or are soon to enter the inventory.
Fortunately for Taiwan, quality, more than quantity, has increasingly become the decisive factor in the battle outcome. Furthermore, the speed of the platform has become less important than the quality of what it carries -- sensors, electronics gadgets, and precision-guided projectiles and munitions.
Taiwan's superiority in conventional arms, however, will be increasingly eroded by the PRC's acquisition of Russian arms in recent years. Of all the arms delivered or to be delivered to the PLA , the most troublesome are:
1) SU-27 and equivalent;
2) the Sovremenny-class destroyers, equipped with sea-skimming 150-mile range SS-N-22 Mosquito (or Sunburn in NATO's designation) and possibly also with cruise missiles; and
3) low-noise Kilo-class submarines.
A substantial quantity of those advanced Russian weapon systems cannot but present major threats to Taiwan.
Models for a PLA operation against Taiwan
The goal of most wars is to conquer the enemy's will to resist to one's terms for peace. Let's assume that should the PRC resort to a military operation against Taiwan, its goal is to coerce Taiwan through "armed persuasion" into succumbing to its formula of "one country, two systems" -- with the least cost to itself and in the shortest possible time, so as to minimize the prospects of international intervention.
Bearing this in mind, the PRC has a spectrum of military options, including but not limited to
1) preemptive missile strikes against key military targets;
2) punitive and harassing operations;
3) blockades of harbors and inter-
dictions of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs); and
4) an all out amphibious invasion.
However, none of the above operations guarantees that PRC can and will achieve its goal.
An amphibious invasion is unlikely
This is a highly risky and most unlikely option. The PRC may opt for this mode only if
1) all other options fail;
2) it has the resources to do the job;
3) it can be sure of deterring or persuading the US to stay put; and
4) it can be sure that the market democracies, especially the US and Japan, will not impose a total ban of imports from China.
An amphibious assault would be preceded by a variety of operations, including -- conventional missile strikes against Taiwan's missile and air defense, its C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, surveillance and reconnaissance), runways of the west-coast airbases, special operations in Taiwan, SLOC blockade interdiction and information warfare.
The PLA's amphibious capability is extremely limited, although it can build up such a capability at short notice. Such an all-out invasion in 2010 or thereafter may succeed, provided that the PRC government is willing accept great costs to itself and that no third party intervenes.
However, the costs to the PRC may prove to too much for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to absorb. For at one end of the cost spectrum is the distinct possibility that a prolonged war could spell the end of the CCP's dictatorial rule and the breakaway of Tibet and Sinjiang.
The PLA suppression of Taiwan's air defense could be followed rapidly by a second-wave air attack aimed at establishing air and naval superiority over an invasion corridor in the Strait and ferrying amphibious and infantry divisions -- employing massive quantities of various vessels, ranging from the fast hovercraft to noncombatant merchant and fishing ships.
A number of tangible and intangible factors will determine whether an amphibious assault can establish and maintain a foothold on Taiwan, such as:
1) the attribution rates on both sides of personnel and equipment;
2) The inter-operability of PLA forces;
3) and the ability of the PLA's logistic system to run such a massive operation.
In short, for an invasion to succeed, the PRC would have to possess the capability to conduct a multi-faceted and multi-staged campaign, involving missile surgical strikes against Taiwan's missile-air defense, airbases and naval harbors, air superiority operation, air assault, airborne insertion, special operations raids, amphibious landings, and maritime area denial operations.
Interdiction and harbor blockades
The PLA probably would resort to progressively more stringent quarantine or blockade actions, beginning with declaring maritime exercise closure areas and bring to halt Taiwan-flagged merchant vessel and oil tankers in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The declaration will lead to a quantum leap in shipping insurance fees.
In the absence of reflagging and/or intervention by a third country, the PLAN's quantitative advantage over Taiwan's navy in surface vessels and submarines may become overwhelming over time.
The Battle for Air
and Naval Superiority
The PLA enjoys an overwhelming quantitative advantage over Taiwan in fighter aircraft and will preserve that advantage forever. Taiwan's advanced and superior fighter aircraft, however, will compensate for its quantitative inferiority.
Thank to the rise of quality over quantity in precision guided munitions (PGMs), the F-16, equipped with AIM 120 (with its shoot-and-forget attribute and 60-mile range) can easily take on and shoot down the Su-27 equipped with air-to-air (AA) missiles of inferior quality.
A kill ratio overwhelming in favor of Taiwan's fighters will offset China's air force's (the PLAAF) quantitative advantage in fighters. But if the PLAAF acquires the equivalent of the AIM 120 from Russia, then quantity will be a decisive factor in determining the outcome of a battle of air superiority.
Put differently, if and when both sides achieve roughly equivalent quality, then quantity will matter again.
Missile strikes unlikely to sway Taiwan
The quantity of China's short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) are expected to increase substantially. If this indeed comes to pass, it will undermine Taiwan's ability to conduct military operations in a most devastating way.
By 2010, the PLA will have deployed 900 M-9 (ballistic missiles) and an even larger quantity of M-11. The first-generation air-launched land attack cruise missile (LACMs) may also enter the PLA inventory.
The PLA's second artillery forces -- its ballistic missile force or "Erpao" -- will most likely launch waves of massive SRBM and LACM strikes against Taiwan's missile and air defense systems, C4ISR, the 10 airbases on the west coast and Zhouyin naval harbor -- aimed at paralyzing or destroying Taiwan's ability to strike back and achieving air and naval superiority at one stroke.
The PLA may not be able to coordinate missile firings with other concurrent military operations, such as air strikes and maritime engagement. However, were Taiwan to rely on an active missile defense exclusively, it may not be able to offset the overwhelming advantage in missiles the PLA is expected to possess in the next decade.
Taiwan will have to find ways to counter the PLA missile strikes other than lower-tiered missile defense system such as MADs (modified air defense systems or PAC 2 plus) and PAC 3 to counter the PLA's offensive SRBMs and LACMs.
In face of this distinct threat, Taiwan has six options:
1) do nothing;
2) acquire a sea-based Theater Missile Defense (TMD) such as the Aegis;
3) strive to join the TMD being developed by the US and Japan;
4) strive to research and develop an indigenous TMD with technology transfers;
5) develop and deploy an indigenous theater missile offensive capability (TMO);
6) harden or move underground its C4, dispersing the critical platforms (such as the second-generation aircraft -- and ensuring the survivability of critical communication and computer systems by going for an optic fiber system and having several duplicates).
Option 1 is out of question; in the face of demands to do something, Taiwan's armed forces simply have to find countermeasures.
Option 2 is a distinct possibility were the US to agree to sell the Aegis systems.
Option 3 may prove to be politically impossible as the US and Japan may yet succumb to the PRC's objections.
Option 4 will be futile unless the US provides assistance and may prove to be beyond Taiwan's financial capability.
Option 5 may prove to be beyond Taiwan's technological capability. How to prevent the missiles from being destroyed before they are in place is a challenge. Even if that can be accomplished they may not prove to be an effective deterrence.
Option 6 is thus the one that can be done at a cost Taiwan can absorb, and may neutralize, to a great extent, the threat posed by the PLA's SBRMs and LACMs.
In short, Taiwan is presently defenseless against missile attacks, but it cannot find a cost-effective countermeasure. Deployment of a sea-based or land-based TMD is feasible, but is the least cost-effective. The estimated ratio of cost of a SRBM to a TMD varies tremendously, ranging from 1:20 to 1:190. Whatever the true ratio, Taiwan has every incentive to opt for TMO as deterrence.
War of diversion and harassment possible
Earlier we mentioned that most wars aim to forcibly persuade the enemy to succumb to one's dictate. In its life-span the PRC has repeatedly resorted to limited wars, but not wars aimed at bringing about the above goal. It has fought wars simply to harass or intimate its enemy (for example, the 1979 incursion into Vietnam). In early 1968 it fought a bloody but short war with the Soviet Union on the Chengbao/Damansk island in the Ussuri river.
In light of history, one cannot rule out the possibility that the PLA may taking advance of a US lack of resolve to occupy an island whose ownership is in dispute, such as Taiping Island in the Spratley atoll chain. The PLA occupied the Paracell (Shisha) islands after a brief clash with Vietnamese forces following the US pullout from Indochina. It occupied Mischief Island shortly after the 7th Fleet pulled out of Subic Bay in the Philippines. The PLA may seize the Prata (Tungsha) atoll island when it senses a right moment.
In addition, Beijing may unleash a military operation of limited scope and duration against Taiwan -- not to accomplish any of the above goals but simply to harass Taiwan, cause a stock market panic, or out of sheer frustration from not being able to bring Taiwan to the negotiating table, much less force Taiwan into accepting its term.
The PRC may also resort to a limited military action to capitalize on and inflame its people's chauvinistic nationalism in order to divert internal discontent, to deflect mounting domestic tension (due to its inability to meet "rising expectations and frustrations"), and to prolong the CCP's dictatorial rule.
Chen Pi-chao
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