The respected publication The Economist recently ran a number of articles on the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). On July 1, one of these posted on the online edition said that the deregulation of the agricultural and financial sectors embodied in the ECFA was likely to have implications for Taiwan’s national security.
The deregulation of agricultural products across the Taiwan Strait will result in increased reliance on Chinese imports to satisfy domestic demand for food and this has the potential to undermine Taiwan’s self-sufficiency in food. Some experts are predicting a global food crisis by 2030. If this were to happen, then Taiwan would be in a worse position because of the ECFA as the agreement would have weakened its domestic agricultural sector. Unsurprisingly, China will remain self-sufficient.
Then there is the financial sector. Further deregulation would allow cross-strait financial institutions to simultaneously set up bases in China and engage in financial activities in Taiwan. In the future, Taiwanese businesses will be able to take out loans from Chinese banks, which will make doing business much more convenient as well as reduce the costs of borrowing Chinese currency.
Although this will bring immediate benefits for industry, it will in essence also mean that China has a firmer grip on businesses and banks in Taiwan, and therefore our economic future. One example of this, mentioned in The Economist article, is the sale of Nanshan Life by AIG, with the blessing of the US government, to a Hong Kong-based company that has Chinese backers. As a result, Taiwanese people could find their life insurance in the hands of Beijing.
If international deregulation is handled properly it results in benefits for both sides. There is, however, real risks for Taiwan, because deregulation could lead to over-reliance on China. This risk, although small, could lead to disastrous circumstances that threaten the very existence of the state.
In the context of cross-strait relations, this risk refers to the possibility, following economic integration, of China exploiting the outbreak of military tension across the Taiwan Strait, however inconsequential, to rein in Taipei. If this were to happen then Taiwan’s national security would be compromised before there was anytime to devise a response.
China would have several options available if it wanted to exploit such a situation, including prohibiting food exports to Taiwan, restricting Taiwanese investment without Chinese backers, or making it harder for Taiwanese businesses to set up in China. There is no reason to suppose that Beijing is not capable of going to such lengths either, as it is run by a dictatorship.
The question on everyone’s mind now is what comes after the ECFA? Trade relations between Taiwan and China will certainly become much closer and this will bring benefits in the first instance, but it will also enable China to lay siege to Taiwan and strangle its food supply. In other words, with Taiwan’s self-sufficiency compromised, we would have no choice but to comply with whatever China wants.
If Taiwan wants to reduce this risk, we really need a more balanced foreign policy, which means we have to engage more with other countries and not just China. We have to make sure we do not place the future of this nation in the hands of a country that to this day remains hostile to our national aspirations.
Chen Tsung-yen is a research coordinator at the Taiwan Brain Trust.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
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