It was only natural that Barack Obama, a president whose election was one of the most revolutionary events in US history, should fill his first 100 days in office with a breathtaking, all-embracing agenda. These are times of trial and upheaval that call for such daring. Strikingly energetic and self-confident, Obama has set out on a titanic journey to remake the US economy and redress a broken, dysfunctional international system.
It is perhaps especially in Obama’s domestic policy — the shift to a more social-democratic tax system and universal health care — that one can best see the new president’s ideological drive. But emphasizing the reduction of social inequalities does not sit easily with the profoundly individualistic American ethos, and the attempt to “Europeanize” the nature of the social contract between the state and its citizens might yet crash into the constitutive principles of the US system.
When it comes to salvaging the US’ financial system, Obama has been more interventionist than any European government. For once, the faltering Czech presidency of the EU reflected a European consensus when it defined Obama’s astronomic financial stimulus as a “road to hell.” The unprecedented explosion of the US’ fiscal deficit raises the risk of high inflation in the future — the kind of scenario Europeans will prevent at all cost.
Obama’s foreign policy agenda has been no less audacious than his domestic undertakings. After eight years of US unilateralism that left behind a broken trans-Atlantic alliance, resuscitated the specter of the Cold War with Russia and saw the Middle East decline into doomsday politics, Obama’s injection of new thinking to endemic problems is extremely welcome.
The organizing principle in the new president’s foreign policy is not having ideological guidelines. Essentially, his approach to international issues is pragmatic and, in departing from his predecessor’s penchant for machtpolitik, Obama has pledged to always exhaust diplomacy first.
But Obama might soon realize that most of his predecessors started as believers in international cooperation until events forced them to fall back on a strategy of confrontation. Even former president George W. Bush didn’t seem committed to a particular doctrine in foreign affairs. It was the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, that drove him to his ill-conceived global “war on terror.”
The real test of Obama’s strategy of dialogue and cooperation will come only when it fails, and tough choices will have to be made.
Repairing old alliances is vital not only for the exercise of US power, but also for Europe’s empowerment as a global player. Yet Washington’s European allies have dealt Obama his first setback.
They applauded him everywhere on his recent trip to Europe, but sent him home almost empty-handed, resisting the idea of a coordinated fiscal stimulus and, after years of preaching multilateralism, turning down his call for more European troops in Afghanistan. For many in Europe, it was easier to live against Bush than to make sacrifices with Obama.
Obama also pushed the “reset button” with Russia, and suggested that he might freeze Bush’s plan to deploy a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland. The expectation was that Russia would join the US in putting pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. But this has not happened.
Nor was North Korea impressed by Obama’s warnings that the US might shoot down its rocket if they went ahead with their launch in defiance of the UN. Shielded behind a protective China, leader Kim Jong-il launched his rocket anyway, and the US refrained from action.
Iran is another front where Obama might be forced to recognize the limits of his conciliatory approach. He has waived Washington’s long-standing demand that Iran stop uranium enrichment as a precondition for negotiations, and he has sworn off any idea of regime change. But the Iranians are the subtlest negotiators, and will make certain that their nuclear program outpaces the negotiations. If that happens, then what?
Nor is it clear what Obama really means by saying that he recognizes Iran’s “rightful place in the community of nations.” If this means a special status at the expense of other Middle East powers such as Egypt or the Gulf states, Obama might run into strong opposition from traditional US allies in the region.
It is right and refreshing that Obama has made clear that the US’ aspiration is to lead, not dominate. But even an exercise in modesty and realism requires strong alliances, with partners ready for sacrifices. Nor would old enemies and competitors like Russia and China readily abandon the benefits of spoiling the US’ plans. It is when this becomes crystal clear, and also when some worn-out foreign-policy paradigms such as the fetish of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fail once again, that real choices will have to be made.
Shlomo Ben Ami is a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as the vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace.
COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath