Listen carefully these days to Israelis and South Koreans. What they are hinting at is no less than a tectonic shift in the international system -- the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world.
Israelis are rediscovering Europe. They intuitively sense that they can no longer rely only on the absolute security guarantee represented by the combination of active and passive support of the US. The war in Lebanon, so frustrating for Israel, accelerated that subtle change. Now Europe and its various contingents are playing a leading role in picking up the pieces there.
The US, of course, remains Israel's life insurance policy, but enlargement and diversification of diplomatic alliances is starting to be seen as crucial by Israeli diplomats, if not by Israeli society.
The Quartet (the US, Russia, the EU and the UN) used to be regarded as "One plus Three," but that is no longer the case. Europe and Russia no longer see themselves as secondary players, because the US, not to mention Israel, needs them.
As for the South Koreans, they are counting on China to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis. They, too, see the world through a prism that makes the US continue to appear essential, but no longer preeminent.
Recently, a high South Korean official listed in hierarchical order the countries that mattered most in the North Korean nuclear crisis. China came first, followed by the US, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, whereas Europe was absent.
These are only a few signs among many others. One could also mention the recent Sino-African summit in Beijing, or the intensification of Venezuelan-Iranian relations. All these developments subtly indicate a deep trend that can be formalized in one sentence -- The unipolar moment of the US, which began in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, is over.
Of course, one should not "bury" the US too soon. The US is much more resilient than its critics believe. It has a unique capacity to rebound, and it controls unparalleled military, intellectual, economic, and even political resources.
The Republicans' defeat in this month's mid-term Congressional elections is a sign that Americans want to sanction their leaders for their strategic and ethical shortcomings, and they did so with gusto.
But this resilience should not hide a deeper evolution. The US is no longer alone. It no longer qualifies, if it ever did, as a "hyper power," to use former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine's term, though it is still far from being a "normal" power.
The inadvertent "passivity" of the US in the Clinton years and the wrong directions of the Bush years coincided with the rise of China and India, as well as Russia's renewed international clout as a result of high oil prices.
These developments ushered in the slow, imperfect return of an unbalanced multi-polar system. The world in which we live may be moving toward the multi-polarity wished for by French President Jacques Chirac, but not necessarily in a successful and stable way.
If, contrary to the traditional "Gaullist" vision, multi-polarity is not bringing stability, but instead generating chaos, there are two reasons for this outcome.
First, key emerging actors -- China, Russia, and India -- are not ready, willing, or even capable of performing a stabilizing international role. They are either too cynical or timid in their vision of the world, or they have others priorities, or both.
They probably contemplate with barely disguised pleasure the difficulties currently encountered by the US in Iraq and elsewhere, but they do not feel any sense of a "compensating responsibility" for global stability. The common good is not their cup of tea. They have too much to catch up with, in terms of national ego and national interest, to care for others.
Second, the EU is the only natural US ally in terms of values. It is the EU that can make multi-polarity work if it plays its role positively.
If the EU appears more concerned with the best ways to avoid the responsibilities that may befall it as a result of the new and enforced modesty of the US, then multi-polarity will result -- by default, not by design -- in a more chaotic world, rather than leading to greater stability.
Europe has a unique chance to demonstrate that it can make a difference in the post-unipolar moment of the US. It starts right now in the Middle East.
The world that Europe has called for is coming closer, and it can fail abysmally without the EU or improve at the margin thanks to it.
In some ways, the end of a unipolar world could truly be the "Hour of Europe." But that can happen only if the EU regains its confidence and steps into a positive role -- one that it must play with, not against, the US.
Dominique Moisi, a founder and senior advisor at IFRI (French Institute for International Relations), is a professor at the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
An old Latin adage reads: Si vis pacem, para bellum. Translated it means: “If you wish peace, then prepare for war.” This adage has many variants and claims to authorship, but what is most important is its message for a peaceful Taiwan. Why should Taiwan prepare for war? The reasons are many and obvious. Certainly, such preparation is not because Taiwan wants war or is a warlike nation. Instead, the answer is found in its neighbor, China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which rules China as a one-party state, is ambitious and troubled — and that combination makes war a viable option,
Hypersonic weapons are defined as armaments capable of traveling at speeds faster than Mach 5 and can be broadly classified into two types: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles. The former are launched into the upper atmosphere by ballistic missiles. The vehicle is then separated from the booster to maneuver, or glide, toward its target. The latter can be launched from a jet plane or rocket to reach supersonic speed before igniting a scramjet engine to achieve hypersonic speeds. As the US engages in a great-power competition with China and Russia, all three countries are racing to field hypersonic
As a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) cadet, I frequently get asked how quickly the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might overrun Taiwan if it invaded before 2040. My answer is that the PLA will not be able to take over Taiwan within that time frame, because the more eager the PLA is to complete the task in a short period, the more likely it would fail — and fail big. Having a slim chance of winning is what keeps the PLA from taking action. From time to time, some PLA leaders or keyboard fighters make threats — one of the
Unless Hollywood movies like Greenland, Deep Impact, and Armageddon have predictive powers and a rogue space rock is heading our way, stopping Chinese Communist Party expansionism is likely to prove the single most challenging and dangerous problem of our lifetimes. How can the United States, Taiwan, and other liberal democracies prepare for and prevent attacks from China? How can Washington bolster Taipei’s confidence when it doesn’t recognize Taiwan as a real country and, so far, lacks the political will to make major adjustments to its ossified China policy and Taiwan policy? How can Taiwan make itself heard on the world stage when