If Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kun (
The legal controversy over whether Chiang committed treason rests solely on the question of whether China is treated as a "foreign country" under Taiwan's laws. Article 113 of the Criminal Code states that it is a crime to enter into any agreements with a "foreign government" without government authorization. Article 2 of the Constitution ambiguously states that the national territory of this country is in accordance with the "existing national boundaries" and leaves open the question of whether China is part of this territory. In addition, the language of the Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (
However, leaving aside the legalese and relying instead on common sense, Beijing is not only a "foreign government" but in fact the government of an enemy state. After all, if Beijing is not a foreign government, then what is the current "Republic of China"(Taiwan) government?
This is reminiscent of the old definition of the crime "rape" under Article 221 of the Criminal Code. Before the 1999 amendment only "women" could be victims of the crime. Therefore, from the standpoint of legal technicality, those who raped men could avoid punishment. That particular loophole has been closed through a legal amendment. The same should be done to solve the ambiguous status of China under Taiwan's laws.
It is shameful and dishonorable for the KMT to abuse these loopholes in this manner. But it not only has refused to apologize for its mistake, KMT spokesperson Su Chi (
Some KMT lawmakers have accused President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and the Democratic Progressive Party of being "jealous" of the KMT and Chiang. The accusation is of course ridiculous, because there is reason to feel jealous of someone only if that person has achieved something admirable.
In its desperation to kill the chances of People First Party Chairman James Soong (
Taiwan's government must take a tough position on this. At the very least, close the legal loopholes to prevent further unauthorized actions.
In dealing with Beijing, each and every step taken must be based on an internal consensus reached in Taiwan and be part of a comprehensive government plan.
The government risks losing control of cross-strait policy if it becomes a trend for political parties and individuals to rush to the other side of the Taiwan Strait to compete for the affections of Beijing behind the government's back.
The damage to the government's dignity and credibility cannot be underestimated.
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